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ABSTRACT
The Paycheck Protection Program, or PPP, was huge. Between April 2020 and May
2021, it provided almost $800 billion to more than 11 million businesses—about a third
of all U.S. businesses with 500 employees or fewer. The PPP was also flawed. Treasury
and the Small Business Administration faced incomplete statutory instructions and a
challenging tradeoff between speed and accuracy in distributing PPP funds.
These flaws make the PPP a realistic and valuable case study; the PPP reveals tools that
can be applied to similar distributions of emergency funds. One tool is back-end
adjustments, meaning that funds are first distributed and then later it is decided
whether recipients may keep the money. Another tool is distribution in descending
order of necessity, meaning that the first recipients to receive funds are applicants that
most clearly meet the criteria of the program. A fund can follow distribution in
descending order of necessity to disburse all of its funds. This approach is similar to a
descending price auction for the sale of bonds or a stock of goods. Disbursing amounts
in descending order of necessity also allows a fund to collect information needed to
improve future distribution policy.
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INTRODUCTION
The Paycheck Protection Program, 1 or PPP, distributed almost $800
billion from the federal government to businesses between April 2020
and May 2021. 2 More than 11 million grants were made, as compared to
a total of about 32 million U.S. small businesses. 3 This huge, broad
emergency money program was the single largest element of U.S.
pandemic relief. 4

1.
2.

See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36).
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM (PPP) REPORT: APPROVALS
THROUGH 05/30/2021 (2021), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/PPP_Report_Public
_210531-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/ACC3-792M] [hereinafter PPP REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH MAY
2021] (reporting 11,823,594 loans and $799.8 billion approved).
3. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. OF ADVOC., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2020),
https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/05122043/Small-Business-FAQ-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CKE5-H6FH] (counting 31.7 million small businesses with fewer than 500 employees
in the U.S., including 25.7 million businesses with no employees).
4. See Hiba Hafiz, Shu-Yi Oei, Diane M. Ring & Natalya Shnitser, Regulating in Pandemic:
Evaluating Economic and Financial Policy Responses to the Coronavirus Crisis 28–74 (Bos. Coll. L. Sch.,
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The PPP was unprecedented in scale. But its policy tradeoff
between speed and accuracy was typical for an emergency fund. 5 When
an emergency requires an urgent fiscal response, often there is
pressure to distribute money immediately but uncertainty about who
should receive how much of it. Legislators typically give incomplete
instructions, leaving administrators broad discretion to decide how to
allocate funds. 6 Administrators need tools to navigate the tradeoff
between speed and accuracy. The PPP offers lessons about tactics that
can work.
One useful tool is back-end adjustments. 7 This means that first the
government distributes emergency funds, and later it decides whether
recipients may keep the money or must return some or all of it. Backend adjustments may seem preferable if they make it easier for
recipients to keep money. This happens if the distributor of funds
relaxes initially strict conditions for repayment. For instance, in June
2020, Congress relaxed several forgiveness requirements for PPP loans,
most importantly by extending the time allowed for spending PPP
grants from eight to twenty-four weeks. 8 Recipients are unlikely to
object to such a change, since it generally makes them better-off than
they were before the adjustment.
But back-end adjustments can also make it harder for recipients to
keep initially granted funds. Money can be taken back not only through
explicit rules but also through mechanisms of encouragement. For
instance, in April and May 2020, Treasury and the Small Business
Administration (SBA) used enforcement safe harbors to encourage
public firms and recipients of grants larger than $2 million to give PPP
money back. 9
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 527, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3555980 (outlining
components of several federal statutes enacted in March 2020, including the CARES Act).
5. See Alexander W. Bartik, Zoe B. Cullen, Edward L. Glaeser, Michael Luca, Christopher T.
Stanton & Adi Sunderam, The Targeting and Impact of Paycheck Protection Loans to Small Businesses 2–3
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27623, 2020), https://www.nber.org/system/files
/working_papers/w27623/w27623.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9PT-2SJ2]. The paper describes a
“tradeoff between speed and targeting” for the PPP because “[t]he planner has the option to either
allocate funds through the banking sector immediately or delay long enough to establish more
control over the process.” Id. at 10.
6. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State, 76
U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2009) (noting the pattern of “entrust[ing] the executive branch with
sweeping power to manage serious crises”).
7. See Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation Through Incremental
Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179, 1187 (2004) (studying “deadline extensions and waivers,
variances, and exceptions” as examples of back-end adjustments).
8. See Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-142, § 3(b), 134
Stat. 641, 641 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)).
9. See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—
Requirements—Promissory Notes, Authorizations, Affiliation, and Eligibility, 85 Fed. Reg. 23,450,
23,451–521 (Apr. 28, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 120–21) (providing “limited safe harbor”
for public firms that gave back loans); Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck
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Changes that encourage or require recipients to give funds back
may seem problematic, as if the emergency fund administrator has
broken a promise. But such changes can be carried out in a way that
respects the rule of law and the rights of recipients. If the chance of a
back-end adjustment is clear in advance, recipients can plan for it and
adjust their reliance accordingly. Here the PPP provides an interesting
example. Treasury and the SBA’s responsibility to enforce the PPP’s socalled hardship certification supported the creation of enforcement
safe harbors that encouraged the return of money. This was arguably
part of the statute’s original framework, although the program’s
capacity for back-end adjustments was not advertised as such. 10
Another tactic for navigating the speed-accuracy tradeoff is
distribution in descending order of necessity. This means that a fund
would first make grants to recipients who most obviously meet the
criteria or goals of the fund. For example, Treasury and the SBA opened
an exclusive two-week PPP application window in February 2021 for
employers with fewer than twenty employees. 11 This was a way of giving
priority to applicants with a stronger claim of necessity.
The approach of distributing in descending order of necessity
diverges from the approach initially used in the PPP, which was to
distribute in accordance with a first-come, first-served queue. 12 The
PPP experience showed that the queue approach allowed betterresourced applicants a better chance at a successful application. 13 Its
first-come, first-served approach did not give priority to applicants who
had greater need for the funds and more obviously met the criteria of
the statute.
The idea of distributing in descending order of necessity could, in
an appropriate case, be used to distribute an entire fund. If smaller
grant size is a good proxy for necessity, then the fund could be
Protection Program as Amended by Economic Aid Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 3,692, 3,706 & n.87 (Jan. 14,
2021) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 113, 120–21) (providing an enforcement safe harbor from audit
of good faith nature of hardship exception for firms that requested $2 million or less and noting
that the safe harbor first appeared in a posted FAQ on May 13, 2020).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(B) (providing that the “same terms, conditions and processes”
that usually applied to SBA loans would also apply to PPP loans).
11. See Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., SBA Prioritizes Smallest of Small Businesses in
the Paycheck Protection Program, Release No. 21-17 (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.sba.gov/article
/2021/feb/22/sba-prioritizes-smallest-small-businesses-paycheck-protection-program [https://
perma.cc/L36N-PXFS] [hereinafter Release No. 21-17] (“Establish[ing] a 14-day, exclusive PPP loan
application period for businesses and nonprofits with fewer than 20 employees”).
12. See Katharine G. Young, Rights and Queues: On Distributive Contests in Modern States, 55
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 65, 75 (2016) (explaining how queues give resources to those who arrive
first).
13. See, e.g., Dan Amiram & Daniel Rabetti, The Relevance of Relationship Lending in Times
of Crisis 1 (Nov. 4, 2020) (unpublished paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3701587 (finding
correlation between banking relationships, especially borrowing relationships, and successful PPP
application).
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distributed in ascending order of grant size—small grants first, then
larger and larger—until fully disbursed. 14 An administrator could also
use the descending-necessity idea more narrowly, to gather
information about the potential applicant pool. The fund could make
early grants based on a best initial estimate of greater necessity, with
the intention that the early grants would not only alleviate the
emergency but also collect information about the applicant pool. The
resulting information could then be used to adjust distribution policy
going forward.
Both of these tactics—back-end adjustments and distributing in
descending order of necessity—fit a fund that addresses an ongoing
medium-term crisis. These tools are useful when there is urgency of
distribution but also enough time to allow a learning curve for fund
administrators. For instance, these tactics fit the needs of a fund meant
to rebuild an economy following a disaster. 15 They also fit the needs of
funds established, for instance, by municipalities or nonprofits, to
provide rent assistance in the wake of an economic crisis.
This Article uses the PPP as a case study to explore emergency fund
administration. Part I of this Article tells the legislative story of the PPP,
including bipartisan support for the idea and drafting influenced by the
Republican-controlled Senate and by the Treasury. The PPP statute
includes some crisply drafted provisions—like those explaining
applicant eligibility, loan size, and payroll requirements. It also includes
some vague provisions—such as the so-called hardship certification.
Part II describes how the PPP worked in practice. Lack of regulation
and a first-come, first-served queue marked its first wave, in the first
two weeks of April 2020. Then, after media criticism of prominent,
large borrowers and an additional Congressional appropriation,
Treasury and the SBA created enforcement safe harbors which
discouraged applications from public firms and for grant amounts over
$2 million. These safe harbors marked the program’s second wave, from
April to August 2020. Another appropriation in December 2020
followed. The resulting third wave featured more targeted sectorspecific allocation and continued the trend of directing more grants to
smaller businesses.
Part III explains features of the PPP as an emergency fund
program. It sets out the statute’s incomplete instructions and the

14. The approach resembles a descending-price auction like those used to sell Treasury
bonds. PAUL F. MALVEY & CHRISTINE M. ARCHIBALD, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, UNIFORM-PRICE
AUCTIONS: UPDATE OF THE TREASURY EXPERIENCE 13 (1998) (comparing auction approaches).
15. An example is the Gulf Coast Claims Facility established by the operators of the
Deepwater Horizon oil rig that exploded in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG,
WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL 130–32 (2012)
(describing the $20 billion undertaking to compensate for damages to business or earnings).
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resulting enforcement discretion held by the agencies. It explains the
different possible interpretations of the hardship certification that
applicants were required to make. It suggests reasons why the agencies
initially chose the unregulated first-come, first-served allocation
mechanism. It delineates the learning curve over the course of the
program’s implementation, which supported an evolving approach to
administrative guidance.
Part IV uses features of the PPP to explain the idea of back-end
guidance. The PPP included both changes that made the program
stricter and those that made the program more generous. These
provide ideas for how back-end adjustments might be used more
generally in emergency fund administration.
Part V explains how an emergency fund administrator might
allocate funds according to descending order of necessity. Like backend guidance, this tool mitigates the tension between speed and
accuracy in the delivery of emergency money. One variation anticipates
distributing smaller grants first, then larger and larger grants until the
“clearing” grant size is determined. The idea is analogous to the
“clearing” price sought in a descending-price auction. Another variation
focuses on using a descending-order-of-necessity distribution tool to
collect applicant pool information early in the process.
I. THE STORY OF THE STATUTE
A. Legislation
On March 27, 2020, as part of the CARES Act, Congress created the
Paycheck Protection Program, placed it under the administrative
auspices of the Treasury and the Small Business Administration, and
funded the PPP with $349 billion. 16 The program emerged from a
bipartisan coalition led by Senators Marco Rubio, Ben Cardin, and
Susan Collins. 17 At a March 18, 2020 press conference, Collins and
Rubio described a $300 billion program to fund “small businesses,”
including their payrolls. The program would help employees in

16. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 1102(a), 134
Stat. 281, 286-93 (2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)) (establishing the Paycheck Protection
Program); id. § 1102(b), 134 Stat. 281, 292-93 (authorizing appropriation of $349 billion).
17. Paul Kane, Unlikely Group in Congress Unifies to Provide Lifeline to Small Businesses Caught in Economic
Free Fall, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/unlikely-group-incongress-unifies-to-provide-lifeline-to-small-businesses-caught-in-economic-free-fall/2020/03/21
/c6ad2704-6b8b-11ea-abef-020f086a3fab_story.html [perma.cc/62LA-KFTW] (reporting that Rubio (RFlorida), chair of the Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee, and Collins (R-Maine),
together with Ben Cardin (D-Maryland) and Nydia M. Velázquez (D-New York), chair of the House Small
Business Committee, had been working on $50 billion bipartisan plan for a month).
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hospitality and other industries who would otherwise be laid off. 18 Also
on that date, Treasury released a proposal under the heading “Small
Business Interruption Loans,” which followed the lines of the Collins
and Rubio description. 19
Key specific PPP loan terms were as follows: Businesses had to
apply through a financial intermediary—a bank authorized to process
PPP applications. 20 PPP loans were nonrecourse 21 and required no
collateral or guarantee. 22 Their interest rate was capped at one
percent. 23 Loans could be made in amounts up to 2.5 times average
monthly payroll, with a cap of $10 million. 24 Successful applicants could
use PPP funds to pay for employee compensation and benefits as well
as other expenses including rent, utilities, and interest. 25
The most generous element of the program involved loan
forgiveness. Loans were eligible for forgiveness if funds were used for
approved purposes—most prominently payroll—within the “covered
period,” originally defined as an eight-week period starting on the date
the loan was issued 26 and later changed to twenty-four weeks. 27 PPP
funding is thus often interchangeably referred to either as “loans” or as
“grants.”
PPP applicants had to meet eligibility requirements, of which two
are particularly important. First, applicants could have no more than

18. Senators Rubio and Collins News Conference, C-SPAN (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.c-span.org
/video/?470464-1/senators-rubio-collins-hold-news-conference [https://perma.cc/DU56-RQJG].
19. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, STAGE THREE PROPOSAL: KEY TERMS (2020), http://static.cspanvideo.org/files/pressCenter/Treasury-Stage-3-Proposal.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS9G-3D3B].
20. § 636(a)(36)(F)(ii) (delegating authority to lenders otherwise approved to make SBA
loans); § 636(a)(36)(F)(iii) (allowing the Treasury and SBA to authorize other lenders to make
loans).
21. § 636(a)(36)(F)(v) (providing for no recourse).
22. § 636(a)(36)(J) (waiving guarantee requirement).
23. The statute provided for an interest rate of up to four percent. § 636(a)(36)(L).
Administrative guidance set the rate at one percent. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes;
Paycheck Protection Program as Amended by Economic Aid Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 3,692, 3,703. (Jan. 14,
2021) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 113, 120–21).
24. § 636(a)(36)(E) (setting maximum loan amount).
25. § 636(a)(36)(F) (describing permitted uses of funds); see also Business Loan Program
Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—Loan Forgiveness Requirements and Loan
Review Procedures as Amended by Economic Aid Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,283, 8,288–90 (Feb. 5, 2021) (to
be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120) (describing payroll and other costs eligible for loan forgiveness).
26. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136 § 1106, 134 Stat. 281, 297 (2020) (outlining forgiveness
terms including eight-week “covered period,” availability for payroll and other costs, reduction in
forgiveness amount if number of employees were reduced, and documentation requirements); see
also Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—Loan
Forgiveness Requirements and Loan Review Procedures as Amended by Economic Aid Act, 86 Fed.
Reg. at 8,293–98 (describing reductions to forgiveness amount rules and documentation
requirements).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 636m(a)(4); Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection
Programs—Revisions to Loan Forgiveness and Loan Review Procedures Interim Final Rules, 85
Fed. Reg. 38,304, 38,307 (June 26, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120).
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500 employees. 28 Hospitality businesses could have no more than 500
employees per physical location, assuming different physical locations
were housed in different entities. 29 These requirements were more
generous than the usual SBA size limitations. 30
Second, PPP applicants had to certify “that the uncertainty of
current economic conditions makes necessary the loan request to
support the ongoing operations of the eligible recipient.” 31 The statute
waived the usual SBA loan prerequisite that an applicant must be
unable to obtain “credit elsewhere.” 32 But it included the vaguely
worded “hardship certification,” which provided Treasury and the SBA
with an important lever for enforcement and guidance.
The PPP presents a tension: the program had a “small business”
headline but the statutory eligibility requirement embraced larger
businesses than that headline might intuitively suggest. 33 Some

28. § 636(a)(36)(D) (“During the covered period, in addition to small business concerns, any
business concern . . . shall be eligible to receive a covered loan if the business concern . . . employs
not more than . . . 500 employees.”).
29. For hospitality businesses, the statute waived usually applicable affiliation rules. See §
636(a)(D)(iv). Typically, these affiliation rules combine entities under common control. See 13 C.F.R.
§ 121.103(a) (2021) (explaining control and affiliation). Since these rules did not apply, a hospitality
business or franchise housed in a separate entity could apply for PPP funds if that entity employed
500 employees or fewer, even if the total number of employees of commonly controlled entities
exceeded 500. If separate entities were established for different restaurant or hotel locations, this
amounted to applying the 500-employee limit on a per-location basis. The rule was applicable to
firms with NAICS industry code starting with 72, covering accommodation and food services. See §
636(a)(D)(iv). There are about 900,000 such businesses in the U.S., of which 650,000 are
restaurants and 120,000 are hotels and other traveler accommodations. See Six Digit NAICS Codes
and Titles, NAICS ASS’N, https://www.naics.com/six-digit-naics/?code=72 [https://perma.cc/VJA55M84]; see also Thomas W. Joo & Alex Wheeler, The “Small Business” Myth of the Paycheck Protection
Program, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 21, 35 (2020) (noting that the franchise affiliation waiver also
applied to car dealerships).
30. The statutory text diverges from previous legal definitions such as the SBA’s table of size
standards based on revenue, number of employees, and industry code. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
TABLE OF SMALL BUSINESS SIZE STANDARDS MATCHED TO NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEMS CODES (2016), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5R76-6TRD]. Under the usual rules, some businesses qualify for SBA loans only
with smaller numbers of employees, such as 100–250 for merchant wholesalers. See id. at 20–23.
Others may qualify with larger numbers of employees, such as up to 1,500 for manufacturers. See
id. at 6–19.
31. § 636(a)(G)(i)(I).
32. § 636(a)(36)(I). The usually applicable provision reads: “The Administrator has the
authority to direct, and conduct oversight for, the methods by which lenders determine whether a
borrower is able to obtain credit elsewhere. No financial assistance shall be extended pursuant to
this subsection if the applicant can obtain credit elsewhere.” § 636(a)(1)(A)(i). “Credit elsewhere”
typically requires an evaluation of private market conditions and the availability of conventional
loans on reasonable terms. § 636(h).
33. The legal definition diverged from intuitive understandings of “small business.” See
Robert A. Peterson, Gerald Albaum & George Kozmetsky, The Public’s Definition of Small Business, 24
J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 63, 64–65 (1986) (reporting survey results including responses to a number-ofemployees question that produced a median of 10.2 and a mean of 29.2); see also Mirit Eyal-Cohen,
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statutory elements support the idea that grants to smaller firms would
better serve the PPP’s purpose. But these are less precise than the
generous 500-employee eligibility rules.
For instance, one provision offers that “[i]t is the sense of the
Senate” that priority should be given to “small business concerns and
entities in underserved and rural markets.” 34 In addition, the structure
of the CARES Act suggests that smaller businesses were the PPP’s
audience, since other parts of the CARES Act offered relief both to
individuals and to larger businesses. Individual grants included
increased unemployment benefits and individual stimulus payments.35
The CARES Act also authorized business loans sponsored by the Federal
Reserve and Treasury, including but not limited to loans to hard-hit
businesses such as airlines. 36 Charging the federal SBA with the
administration of the PPP might suggest that small businesses should
have been prioritized. 37 And legislator statements also suggested a
preference for small business. 38
Nothing in the statute required that preference be given to smaller
businesses among those businesses that were eligible to apply. But
Treasury and the SBA did have the lever of the so-called hardship
certification, which applicants were required to make “in good faith.”
Applicants had to certify “that the uncertainty of current economic
conditions makes necessary the loan request to support the ongoing
operations of the eligible recipient.”39 With the single regulatory lever of
this hardship or necessity certification, and their discretionary ability
to enforce it, Treasury and the SBA eventually demonstrated that they
could prefer some applicants over others.

Legal Mirrors of Entrepreneurship, 55 B.C. L. REV. 719, 720–21 (2014) (reviewing uncertainty about
small business definition and relationship between social and legal definitions).
34. § 636(a)(P)(iv).
35. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6428 (a) (providing for cash payments to individuals of $1,200 per
adult and $500 per child); 15 U.S.C. § 9023 (providing for additional $600 per week in
unemployment benefits through July 31, 2020); see also Hafiz et al., supra note 4, at 46–54
(describing and analyzing the individual stimulus and unemployment provisions of the CARES
Act).
36. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 9042(c)(2)(A). The statute authorized $500 billion in loans and loan
guarantees for “eligible businesses for which credit is not reasonably available at the time of the
transaction,” including $25 billion to airlines. Id. See also Lev Menand, The Federal Reserve and the
2020 Economic Crisis, 26 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 295, 315–21 (2021) (describing ad hoc credit facilities).
37. The language of the primary operative small business lending section suggests that the
SBA has discretion in operating the program. See 15 U.S.C. § 636(a) (“The Administration is
empowered to the extent and in such amounts as provided in advance in appropriation Acts to
make loans . . . to any qualified small business concern . . . for purposes of this chapter.”).
38. For instance, the initial remarks made by Senators Rubio and Collins about the purpose
of the program—before public criticism of larger PPP recipients in the first wave—illustrates a
statutory purpose of assisting small business. See supra text accompanying note 18 (describing
March 18, 2020 press conference).
39. § 636(a)(G)(i)(I).
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However, they did not do this right away. In the first wave of spring
funding, in late March and early April, guidance simply said that the
program was “first come, first served.” 40 Private actors—applicants and
intermediary banks—determined access to the program. 41 Applicants’
technical or formalist approaches to interpreting the so-called hardship
certification supported a broad interpretation. The result was that
larger and better-resourced firms, rather than smaller or more needy
firms, disproportionately claimed PPP grants.42
The first wave of PPP funding was quickly exhausted. In April 2020,
Congress increased the appropriation from $349 billion to $659 billion.43
Treasury and the SBA took a different approach to this second wave of
2020 funding from April through August. Specifically, they used the
hardship certification as a regulatory lever. Their guidance did not
explicitly bar certain applicants. Rather, administrators both
threatened enforcement and promised immunity from enforcement.
For instance, Treasury stated both that public firms might be audited
with respect to the accuracy of their hardship certifications, and also
that private firms that applied for $2 million or less in funding would
not be audited. 44
In June 2020, Congress amended the PPP to increase its
“flexibility.” 45 The key changes were in the forgiveness portions of the
statute. Most importantly, the time allowed to spend PPP grants on
eligible expenses was extended from eight weeks to twenty-four
weeks. 46 Also, the withdrawal of forgiveness for workforce reduction
was relaxed in the event that workforce reduction was related to
“worker or customer safety requirement(s) related to COVID-19,” and
only sixty percent of PPP grants (rather than the seventy-five percent
earlier stated in administrative guidance) were required to be spent on
payroll costs rather than other allowed expenses. 47
In July 2020, Congress extended the appropriation time frame.
Under the March and April statutes, applications had to be submitted

40. See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed.
Reg. 20,811, 20,813 (Apr. 15, 2020) (“Is the PPP ‘first-come, first-served’? Yes.”).
41. See infra Section II.A.
42. Id.
43. Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 116-139, §
101(a), 134 Stat. 620, 620 (2020).
44. See infra Section II.C.
45. See Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-142, § 3, 134 Stat.
641, 641–43 (2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636).
46. See Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-142, § 3(a), 134 Stat.
641, 641 (2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(A)(iii)).
47. See id.
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by June 30, 2020. 48 The July 4th statutory amendment extended the
application deadline to August 8, 2020. 49
In December 2020, Congress funded the PPP for a third time, with
$284 billion. 50 It gave more restrictive and precise instructions for
“second draw” loans offered to borrowers who had already received PPP
loans. 51 Second draw applicants had to employ not more than 300
employees 52—down from 500. They had to meet a new revenuereduction requirement, by showing at least a twenty-five percent
reduction in gross receipts in one quarter in 2020 compared to the
same quarter in 2019. 53 The loan amount continued to be based on 2.5
times the average monthly payroll for most firms, but it was 3.5 times
for hospitality firms. 54 Also, the maximum loan size was reduced from
$10 million to $2 million. 55 The terms of loan forgiveness were more
carefully specified and included permission for additional expenses
such as a “covered worker protection expenditure,” which included
expenditures for capital improvements such as drive-through windows
or ventilation systems. 56 The December 2020 statute also authorized a
simple one-page forgiveness process for loans of $150,000 or less.57
The December 2020 iteration of the PPP also more exactly stated
how Treasury and the SBA should allocate funds. In addition to offering
more favorable eligibility rules for restaurants and other hospitality
firms, it provided specific allocations for loans through community
financial institutions and banks with assets less than $10 billion, and
loans to certain small applicants and new applicants. 58 A related

48. See CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 1102(b), 134 Stat. 281, 293 (2020) (providing
appropriation for period February 15, 2020, to June 30, 2020); Paycheck Protection Program and
Health Care Enhancement Act § 101(a) (increasing appropriation dollar amount but making no
change to appropriation time period).
49. An Act to Extend the Authority for Commitments to the Paycheck Protection Program,
Pub. L. No. 116-147, § 1, 134 Stat. 660, 660 (2020) (extending appropriation period to August 8,
2020).
50. See Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses, Nonprofits, and Venues Act, Pub. L. No.
116-260, § 323(d), 134 Stat. 1993 (2020) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)) (appropriating
$284.45 billion).
51. See id. § 311 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(37)).
52. See id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. 636(a)(37)(A)(iv)(I)(aa)). The hospitality business physicallocation rule and the rule waiving affiliation rules for some businesses remained unchanged.
53. 15 U.S.C. 636(a)(37)(A)(iv)(I)(bb) (also providing rules applicable to entities not in business
for all of 2019).
54. § 636(a)(37)(C)(iv).
55. § 636(a)(37)(C)(i).
56. § 636(a)(37)(J)(iii).
57. Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses, Nonprofits, and Venues Act § 307(a)(3)
(providing for one-page form that requires information about number of retained employees,
estimated amount of loan spent on payroll and total loan value).
58. See id. § 323(d)(1)(A)(iii) (providing appropriations of $15 billion made by community
financial institutions, $15 billion by banks with assets less than $10 billion, and $15 billion for
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provision provided $15 billion for shuttered performance venues.59 And
another provision instructed the SBA to issue guidance “addressing
barriers to accessing capital” for certain groups. 60
By December 2020, Congress had provided more specific
instructions on how the PPP should be administered. Still, Treasury
and the SBA continued to make important administrative decisions.
For instance, as the Biden administration announced in February 2021,
Treasury and the SBA established a two-week application window
exclusively for firms that employed fewer than twenty employees. 61 The
agencies expanded eligibility for applicants with criminal histories not
including fraud. 62 They eliminated consideration of whether an
applicant had defaulted on federal student loans. 63
The tail of the PPP continued in Congressional appropriations in
2021, as the American Rescue Plan Act enacted in March 2021 provided
$7.25 billion in additional funding.64 The same statute also made
additional specific allocations for shuttered venue operators 65 and
restaurants. 66 These later enactments in December 2020 and March
2021 became more targeted in their use of the PPP to assist businesses
in certain sectors. The increased focus on certain sectors or groups of
firms, such as customers of smaller banks, employers of fewer than
twenty employees, and shuttered venue operators, was very different
from the first-come, first-served approach of March and April 2020
during the first wave of the program. Over twelve months, the program
had changed.

borrowers with no more than 10 employees or for applicants in low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods requesting an amount not more than $250,000).
59. Id. § 323(d)(1)(H) (providing $15 billion appropriation); see id. § 324 (explaining eligibility
for shuttered performance venues and related businesses).
60. “Not later than 10 days after the date of enactment of this paragraph, the Administrator
shall issue guidance addressing barriers to accessing capital for minority, underserved, veteran,
and women-owned business concerns for the purpose of ensuring equitable access to covered
loans.” 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(37)(M).
61. Release No. 21-17, supra note 11.
62. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—Revisions
to Loan Amount Calculation and Eligibility, 86 Fed. Reg. 13,149, 13,154–55 (Mar. 8, 2021) (to be
codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120) (removing one-year lookback restriction for “non-financial fraud
felonies”).
63. Id. at 13,155 (eliminating consideration of delinquency or default with respect to federal
student loans).
64. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 5001(d), 135 Stat. 4 (increasing PPP
appropriation by $7.25 billion to $813.7 billion).
65. See id. § 5005(a) (adding $1.25 billion in appropriations for shuttered venue operators).
66. See id. § 5003(b) (establishing a Restaurant Revitalization Fund of $28.6 billion). During
the initial twenty-one-day grantmaking period, the statute directed priority for women-owned
and veteran-owned businesses and for socially and economically disadvantaged businesses. See id.
§ 5003(c)(3).
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B. Administration
As other scholars have noted, there were flaws in the PPP statute.
Its reliance on financial intermediaries probably was necessary to push
money out quickly. 67 But this reliance came with certain structural
biases, including the tendency to favor existing bank clients68 and to
entrench racial disparities. 69 The PPP has been unfavorably compared
to automatic wage subsidies like those used in other countries, on the
theory that a more automatic or direct program would have better
supported continued employment. 70 Others have argued that the
vagueness of the PPP statute was a flaw because, for instance, it left the
statute vulnerable to re-interpretation by the media. 71
One way to react to these flaws is to explain how Congress could fix
them, in search of a first-best program. For instance, Congress could
avoid the imperfections of market intermediaries by building a system
that allowed government to transfer money directly to businesses. 72
Congress could also prevent media coverage from re-interpreting the
statute by providing more careful and specific distribution

67. See Todd Baker & Kathryn Judge, How to Help Small Businesses Survive COVID-19 110
(Columb. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 620, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3571460 (arguing that PPP needed to work through existing financial
institutions in order to function).
68. See infra Section II.A; see, e.g., Amiram & Rabetti, supra note 13, at 1 (finding correlation
between banking relationships, especially borrowing relationships, and successful PPP
application).
69. See infra Section II.F; see, e.g., Jeffrey Wang & David Hao Zhang, The Cost of Banking
Deserts: Racial Disparities in Access to PPP Lenders and Their Equilibrium Implications 10 (Apr. 29,
2021) (unpublished paper), https://davidzhang.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dhz/files/geographyppp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CWY3-8V76] (finding that ZIP codes with 10% higher Black population have a 1.3%
lower take-up rate of PPP loans).
70. See STEVEN HAMILTON, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, FROM SURVIVAL TO REVIVAL: HOW TO HELP
SMALL BUSINESSES THROUGH THE COVID-19 CRISIS (2020) https://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers
/from_survival_to_revival_how_to_help_small_businesses_through_the_covid_19_crisis [https://
perma.cc/RP7R-7R3W]. Hamilton favors a refundable credit against employer payroll tax
obligations, or “effectively a wage subsidy,” rather than the PPP, including delivery of funds via
improved IRS payroll tax data base which could have directly analyzed information and provided
funds. Id.; cf. Steven Hamilton, A Tale of Two Wage Subsidies: The American and Australian Fiscal
Responses to COVID-19, 73 NAT’L TAX J. 829, 843 (2020) (noting capacity of Australian system to shift
tax remittance into reverse).
71. See, e.g., Ilya Beylin, The Ignominious Life of the Paycheck Protection Program, 23 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 33–40), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3661005.
72. See, e.g., Michael Barr, Howell Jackson & Margaret Tahyar, The Financial Response to the
COVID-19 Pandemic 11 (Univ. of Mich. L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 20-040, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3666461 (“[T]he United States could have
created a better and less complex system for channeling funds to small businesses”); Charles M.
Kahn & Wolf Wagner, Liquidity Provision During a Pandemic, J. BANKING & FIN., June 2021, at 2–3
(reviewing arguments for public grants to fund firms directly).
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instructions. 73 Additionally, Congress could enact automatic stabilizers
that would provide immediate ballast in case of an economic crisis. 74
The effort to describe a first-best system is a worthy enterprise, but
it is not this Article’s task. Instead, this Article analyzes the world of
what has been aptly called the “forty-second best.” 75 In other words, this
Article takes the PPP statute as it finds it. The PPP is an interesting
emergency fund case study precisely because it is flawed. The goal here
is to surface lessons that might improve administration of other similar
and imperfect emergency funds.
C. Similar Emergency Funds
An emergency fund comparable to the PPP has minimal or vague
instructions and features information and time constraints. Generally,
it is medium-term in length, occurring over a period of months. This
provides enough time for some learning and rule adjustment, but it
does not eliminate the tradeoff between speed and accuracy.
Not all funds that respond to a crisis will be comparable to the PPP
in this way. For instance, not all such funds feature minimal or vague
instructions. Some funds, such as tort-based compensation funds or
insurance funds, feature ex ante distribution rules based on a known
body of law. An example of a fund set up to discourage tort claims is the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund. 76 In such a case, the idea is
to provide claimants with damages related to the strength of the tort
claim they could have brought in lieu of making a claim against the
fund. 77 An example of an insurance fund is a Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) allocation to pay for otherwise uninsured
property ruined in a federally declared disaster. 78 In the FEMA case, ex
ante distribution rules are drawn from conventions of insurance law.
Emergency funds also differ from tools of economic policy that
refuse the task of allocating funds. An example is the reduction of a

73. Joo & Wheeler, supra note 29, at 40 (“Most media outlets uncritically accepted lawmakers’
portrayal of the PPP as a small-business rescue program; thus the criticism of corporations
provided cover for the confused design of the program.”).
74. See, e.g., Olivier J. Blanchard & Lawrence H. Summers, Automatic Stabilizers in a Low-Rate
Environment, 110 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 125, 126 (2020) (proposing “‘semi-automatic’ stabilizers, i.e.
tax or spending measures triggered by the crossing of some statistical threshold, be it a low output
growth rate, or a high unemployment rate.”).
75. Thanks to Professor Daniel Shaviro for this term.
76. See FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 41–44 (explaining that the fund was set up in conjunction
with congressional limitation of tort liability).
77. See ROBERT L. RUBIN & SUZANNE A. BRATIS, FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF
CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 303, 336 (2006) (noting connection between
distribution principles and “individual, case-by-case tort principles” for September 11 fund).
78. See id. at 303, 312–22 (describing FEMA’s insurance approach).
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benchmark interest rate by a central bank. Historically, central banks
have allowed the market to decide how to allocate the benefits of such
interest rate reductions. 79
The PPP example is also characterized by a certain timeframe. It
provides an example of an emergency fund that experienced pressure
to distribute funds quickly, but also had enough time to revise and
adjust allocation instructions. Disbursements occurred over fourteen
months, from April 2020 to May 2021. The label “medium-term” seems
to fit this time horizon. In some other emergency fund cases, the
urgency of distribution may be higher than in the PPP case, and the
lessons described here may not fit. For example, the distribution of
funds for food and emergency housing immediately following a
disaster is not a good candidate for later back-end adjustments.
These caveats still leave a fair number of emergency funds that
might benefit from the lessons of the PPP. For instance, the lessons
could apply to a fund meant to rebuild an economy following a disaster
or crisis, where the fund is not bound by ex ante rules. One example is
the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, a fund set up to compensate for
economic damage after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion. 80
The lessons could also apply to funds for housing, health care, and rent
assistance following an economic downturn, whether they are
administered by a nonprofit, by a private fund administrator, or by the
government.
II. THREE PPP WAVES
A. First Wave: Deregulation and the First $349 Billion
Initially, the PPP was a free-for-all—a “competition . . . open to all
comers and usually with no rules.”81 The story of the PPP’s first wave
shows what happens when well-resourced regulated parties are
incentivized to take advantage of a law and face relatively few
constraints. The constraints they did face came first from the private
sector—via the media—not from government guidance.
The PPP statute did not give clear instructions to Treasury and the
SBA about how to allocate the limited funds provided for the program.
79. See, e.g., Jane Ihrig & Scott A. Wolla, The Fed’s New Monetary Policy Tools, FED. RSRV. BANK
ST. LOUIS, 2 (Aug. 2020), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/page1-econ/2020/08/03/thefeds-new-monetary-policy-tools [https://perma.cc/TL25-SDSQ] (explaining that monetary policy
“is transmitted through financial markets to affect . . . spending decisions”).
80. See FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 129–32 (describing the $20 billion undertaking to
compensate for damages to individuals and business).
81. Free-for-All, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/free-forall [https://perma.cc/Z45V-URC5].
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No metric explained how to choose among applicants when the
program was oversubscribed. 82 Because the meaning of the hardship
certification was unclear, 83 the statutory text could be read to throw the
door open to any eligible applicant on a first-come, first-served basis.
As explained above, the main factor limiting applications was a 500employee maximum, and this was relaxed for hospitality businesses. 84
For the first wave of funding in March and early April 2020,
Treasury and the SBA did little to administer the PPP. Instead, the PPP
story was driven by applicants, not shaped by government. Key pieces
of early guidance demonstrated deregulation, rather than regulation.
For instance, in early April, Treasury and the SBA offered the following
question and answer in posted guidance: “Is the PPP ‘first come, first
served’? Yes.” 85 Other guidance indicated that banks would face no
liability for misrepresentations made by applicants.86
The initial CARES Act allocation of $349 billion was exhausted
within two weeks. 87 Its distribution favored well-resourced and wellconnected applicants. Larger loans made to banks’ pre-existing
customers predominated in this first wave of the program. The growing
literature that empirically studies the PPP consistently finds that
banking relationships predict whether a business applied for and
received a PPP grant in the first wave.
One study considers public firms that received PPP grants and
finds that firms that disclose banking relationships in their filings
received larger grants and received them more quickly. 88 A lending
relationship in particular correlates with faster receipt of funds, which
suggests that banks were concerned about default risk, which a PPP
grant could alleviate. 89 Another study finds, based on a survey of both
public and privately held recipients of PPP funds, that larger firms were
more likely to be funded in the early stages of the PPP, and that the
effect is more pronounced for larger banks, which suggests that a
82. See supra Section II.A (explaining results of first wave).
83. See infra Section III.C (noting interpretive range of hardship certification).
84. See supra Section I.A (explaining details of statute).
85. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes: Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg.
20,811, 20,813 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120) (promulgating the PPP’s first
interim final rule based on previously posted guidance).
86. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM LOANS: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/Final%20PPP%20FAQs%
20%28August%2011%2C%202020%29-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6BJ-MHCH] [hereinafter PPP:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS] (“[L]enders may rely on borrower representations . . . .”).
87. See ROBERT J. DILGER & SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46397, SBA PAYCHECK
PROTECTION PROGRAM (PPP) LOAN FORGIVENESS: IN BRIEF 1 (2020) (reporting that lending began on
April 3, 2020 and ended on April 16, 2020).
88. See Amiram & Rabetti, supra note 13, at 10–12, 27 tbl.3 (finding coefficients of 0.2 to 0.3 for
the existence of a relationship and coefficients of 0.6 to 0.7 for workforce size).
89. Id. at 12–14, 29 tbl.5 (finding stronger correlation for lending relationships than for
deposit relationships).
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“concierge” incentive prompted larger banks to take care of their larger
customers first. 90 Other work corroborates the idea that pre-existing
loans with an intermediary bank predicted application success, perhaps
because the receipt of PPP funds would make it more likely that
borrowers would pay back the money they owed to the bank. 91 Another
study organized observations geographically and found that a higher
density of SBA bank member offices correlated both with lower
unemployment and with more PPP loans. 92
Available data also suggest that smaller firms tended to have a more
acute need for funds. There is variation in firms’ cash needs. 93 For
instance, one study shows that for firms with 1–49 employees, 15% were
shut down as of mid-April, compared to 5% for firms with 50–499
employees. 94 Nevertheless, smaller firms were less likely to successfully
apply for PPP funding in the first wave of the program. One study based
on daily surveys of businesspeople from March 28–May 16, 2020
explains:
The smallest businesses were slower to become aware of
government programs. . . . [T]he smallest firms were less likely
to apply for the PPP and, conditional on applying, they applied
90. Tetyana Balyuk, Nagpurnarand Prabhala & Manju Puri, Indirect Costs of Government Aid and
Intermediary Supply Effects: Lessons from the Paycheck Protection Program 62 tbl.XIV (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.
Ctr. for Fin. Rsch., Working Paper 2021-01, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3796210 (showing that in the first wave, the presence of a Big-10 bank correlated strongly with PPP
loan size and with firm size for successful applicants).
91. Bartik et al., supra note 5, at 21, 64 tbl.2 (associating pre-existing loan with 4.4 percentage
point increase in probability of approval and pre-existing relationship with loan officer with 6
percentage point increase); see also Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Olivier Darmouni, Stephan Luck &
Matthew Plosser, Bank Liquidity Provision Across the Firm Size Distribution 5 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y. ,
Staff Report No. 942, 2020) (“The SMEs [small and medium enterprises] in our data that received
PPP funds reduced their non-PPP bank borrowing in 2020Q2 by between 53 and 125 percent of the
amount of their PPP funds.”).
92. Santiago Barraza, Martin A. Rossi & Timothy J. Yeager, The Short-Term Effect of the
Paycheck Protection Program on Unemployment 14 tbl.3 (Aug. 2020) (unpublished paper),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3667431. The paper also found that higher density of SBA bank member
offices correlated with lower unemployment, by about one and four tenths percentage points, in
April 2020. Id.
93. See Joseph Parilla, Sifan Liu & Brad Whitehead, How Local Leaders Can Stave off a Small Business
Collapse from COVID-19, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/howlocal-leaders-can-stave-off-a-small-business-collapse-from-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/AQC2-CDLB]
(“[W]e know that the smallest firms are the least liquid.”); see also Alexander W. Bartik, Marianne
Bertrand, Zoe Cullen, Edward L. Glaeser, Michael Lucac, & Christopher Stanton, The Impact of COVID-19
on Small Business Outcomes and Expectations, 117 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 17656, 17662 (2020) (finding that
50% of businesses with 500 employees or fewer surveyed between March 27 and April 4, 2020, had only
enough cash to cover between 1 and 2 months of expenses, and 25% had only enough cash to cover 15
days or less of expenses).
94. Tomaz Cajner, Leland D. Crane, Ryan A. Decker, John Grigsby, Adrian Hamins-Puertolas,
Erik Hurst, Christopher Kurz & Ahu Yildirmaz, The U.S. Labor Market During the Beginning of the
Pandemic Recession 19 (Becker Friedman Inst., Working Paper No. 2020-58, 2020), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=3595452.
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later, waited longer for their application to be approved, and
were less likely to get approval. 95
The first wave also revealed racial disparities in the experience of
small businesses following the onset of the pandemic. Businesses
owned by people of color experienced more acute cash shortages 96 and
lower rates of banking relationships. 97 They closed at a higher rate—
almost double—compared to businesses owned by white persons. 98
There were also wide racial disparities in early PPP funding—more
so than in later waves. 99 Studies agree that white-owned businesses
were more likely to receive PPP funds, and to receive larger grants, in
the first wave of the program. For instance: firms in majority-white
congressional districts constitute seventy-seven percent of small
businesses, but received eighty-three percent of PPP loans as of midApril 2020. 100 Also, between April 3 and April 16, 2020, there were about
0.27 PPP loans per employer establishment in counties with no
minority-owned businesses and about 0.15 loans per employer
establishment in counties with more than 45% minority-owned
businesses. 101 Also, white borrowers received loans that were
substantially larger than those received by borrowers of color. 102
95. John Eric Humphries, Christopher A. Neilson & Gabriel Ulyssea, Information Frictions and
Access to the Paycheck Protection Program 3 (Cowles Found., Discussion Paper No. 2247, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3667636 (reporting that firms with zero to four and five tenths FTE were
twenty-three percentage points less likely to apply for PPP loans and that when they did apply, they
applied two days later and were twenty-seven percentage points less likely to have received
approval).
96. Lucas Misera, An Uphill Battle: COVID-19’s Outsized Toll on Minority-Owned Firms, FED. RSRV.
BANK CLEV., at 2–3 (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.clevelandfed.org/region/article?ID=DDA321FEADC5-4DA7-9A1C-122DB2F4413D [https://perma.cc/HRG3-M73W] (noting that Black-owned,
Hispanic-owned, and Asian-owned businesses experienced more acute cash shortages than whiteowned businesses during the COVID-19 crisis).
97. Claire Kramer Mills & Jessica Battisto, Double Jeopardy: COVID-19’s Concentrated Health and Wealth
Effects in Black Communities, FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y., at 2, 6 (Aug. 2020), https://www.newyorkfed.org
/medialibrary/media/smallbusiness/DoubleJeopardy_COVID19andBlackOwnedBusinesses [https://
perma.cc/XTY8-9J92] (finding that despite at least equal rates of application for financing, Black firms are
less likely to have a recent borrowing relationship with a bank).
98. Id. at 1 (finding that Black firms have been “almost twice as likely” to close, as compared
to small firms overall); Misera, supra note 96, at 2–3 (noting that Black-owned, Hispanic-owned,
and Asian-owned businesses closed at a higher rate than white-owned businesses).
99. See infra Section II.F.
100. Jason Grotto, Zachary R. Mider & Cedric Sam, White America Got a Head Start on SmallBusiness Virus Relief, BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-pppracial-disparity/ [https://perma.cc/9HUU-AJCY].
101. See Robert Fairlie & Frank M. Fossen, Did the Paycheck Protection Program and Economic
Injury Disaster Loan Program Get Disbursed to Minority Communities in the Early Stages of COVID-19? 12
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28321, 2021), https://www.nber.org/system/files
/working_papers/w28321/w28321.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KBM-NNBM] (showing relationship
weighted by population in Figure 6).
102. Rachel Atkins, Lisa Cook & Robert Seamans, Discrimination in Lending? Evidence from
the Paycheck Protection Program 40 tbl.7 (May 31, 2021) (unpublished paper), https://ssrn.com
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Perhaps the results of the free-for-all were predictable. It makes
sense that smaller businesses might have fewer resources to pursue
PPP funding quickly. Historic and continuing discrimination explains
why businesses owned by people of color have less access to banking
relationships, which in turn were key to unlocking access to the PPP.
More generally, it is unsurprising that the best-resourced tend to win at
unregulated games.
But there is more to say about the specifics of the way in which the
winners won. At least two mechanisms explain the outcome observed
in the first wave of the PPP. One mechanism involved technical
compliance. The second mechanism involved gatekeepers.
Technical compliance helps explains how the best-resourced and
best-connected regulated parties initially “won” the PPP game. These
applicants followed all the specific requirements of the statute. They
applied the employee limits, including the details of the hospitalityindustry dis-affiliation rule. They submitted the data required by the
statute, including payroll data needed to show the maximum loan
amount, allowed up to 2.5 times monthly payroll. Well-resourced firms
checked all the boxes.
In the hardship certification part of the application, many wellresourced applicants likely took aggressive positions “that the
uncertainty of current economic conditions makes necessary the loan
request to support the ongoing operations of the eligible recipient.” 103
They may not have falsified the existence of employees or payroll.104
But they may have made the hardship certification based on a worstcase scenario, rather than assuming the most likely outcome. 105
These well-resourced businesses might also have rested their
hardship certification on the truth of a logical syllogism like this one: “If
we obtain a PPP loan, we will keep more employees on payroll. If we do
not obtain a PPP loan, we will dismiss these employees.” Under this
framework, a PPP loan is a logical prerequisite to ongoing operations of
the business. This kind of technical compliance involves interpreting
vague language in the applicant’s favor to support claiming the
/abstract=3774992 (showing pre-May 1, 2020, coefficients that show that white owners received
loan amounts, measured by the natural log of the loan amount, that were about twenty-nine
percent larger than baseline, while Black business owners received loan amounts that were about
ten percent smaller than baseline).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(G)(i)(I).
104. See, e.g., Max Jaeger, Pair Pretending to Be Farmers in Virus Loan Fraud Sentenced, LAW360
(June 2, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/1390417/pair-pretending-to-be-farmers-in-virusloan-fraud-sentenced [https://perma.cc/AE3Y-8MK3] (describing fraudulent applications for PPP
loans with claim of “nonexistent employees and payroll obligations”).
105. Pete Vegas, PPP Loan Terms Amount to Legalized Fraud, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/ppp-loan-terms-amount-to-legalized-fraud-11587422730 [https://perma.cc/7LDGQFB3] (noting that while the author’s food-processing business was still operating, future threat of
shutdown existed).
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hardship certification. The ambiguous text allowed well-resourced
applicants to choose an interpretation that favored those applicants. 106
When restaurant companies like Shake Shack and Potbelly and large
hospitality firms like the Ashford Hospitality Trust applied for PPP
grants, they presumably developed a position that placed them within
the lines drawn by the law. They could take advantage of the leeway
provided by the statute, rather than focusing on the placement of the
law under the auspices of the SBA or on the sense of the Senate
provision that encouraged preference for smaller applicants. Contrary
to the strand of public opinion that resisted the eligibility of larger
firms for PPP grants, one paper estimates that under the technical
terms of the statute, about half of public firms were eligible to apply for
PPP funding. 107
Gatekeeper theory further explains how well-resourced firms “won”
in the first wave of the PPP. Applying to the PPP required a bank, since
financial institutions were designated as the entities who would
receive, process, and submit applications to the SBA. 108 This kind of
market intermediary is a gatekeeper and can be enlisted to restrict or
police the granting of benefits. 109
But if the gatekeeper is not so enlisted, the gatekeeper’s incentives
are to further its own interests and the interests of its clients. And the
administration of the PPP did not enlist gatekeepers to help enforce the
program or implement the components of the program intended to
mitigate hardship and necessity. Instead, SBA guidance released on
April 3, 2020, provided that intermediary “lenders may rely on borrower
representations” except for “minimal review of calculations based on a
payroll report by a recognized third-party payroll processor.”110 Under
this guidance, financial institutions were not responsible if their clients
falsely or aggressively made a hardship representation.
106. See Alex Raskolnikov, Probabilistic Compliance, 34 YALE J. REG. 491, 497 (2017) (noting the
“one-way ratchet” of uncertain or probabilistic standards that encourage well-advised clients to
take aggressive positions).
107. Anna Cororaton & Samuel Rosen, Public Firm Borrowers of the US Paycheck Protection
Program 2 (Mar. 25, 2021) (unpublished paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3590913 (providing
estimate based on 500-employee cutoff).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(F)(ii), (iii) (designating banks and other lenders to “process, close,
disburse and service” loans).
109. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53–56 (1986) (introducing gatekeeper concept); see also John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U.L. REV. 301, 308
(2004) (explaining that a gatekeeper is a reputational intermediary who receives a small payoff
from misconduct and can discourage law violations); Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L.
REV. 1583, 1586 (2010) (extending concept to multiple gatekeepers and analogizing to joint and
several liability).
110. PPP: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 86, at 1 (“Providing an accurate calculation
of payroll costs is the responsibility of the borrower . . . . [L]enders may rely on borrower
representations, including with respect to amounts required to be excluded from payroll costs.”).
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There were no instructions from Treasury and the SBA that a bank
should prioritize applications made by needier borrowers. Indeed,
some banks have alleged (though Treasury and SBA officials have
denied) that government officials instructed banks to “go to their
existing customer base” in the first wave of the program. 111 Meanwhile,
banks’ systems were not up to the task of processing the sheer number
of applications. 112 Finite bank capacity was a critical limited resource.
Not surprisingly, “whether a firm made the cut [of receiving aid under
the first PPP wave] often came down to how and where it banked.” 113
Firms with closer banking relationships, whether with large
commercial banks or smaller community banks, had a better chance of
persuading a banker to process an application.
Some customers alleged that banks breached common law or state
law when they implemented the PPP. Complaints charged that banks
chose only some applications to process and picked larger or
established customers over smaller clients. 114 The underlying theory of
the case recognized that not all applications could be processed.
Instead, the emergency fund setup presented the task of prioritizing
and allocating grants. In the first two weeks of the program, when the
first $349 billion was disbursed, the government did not set priorities—
so private parties did. 115

111.

See STAFF OF SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS, 116TH CONG., UNDERSERVED

AND UNPROTECTED: HOW THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION NEGLECTED THE NEEDIEST SMALL BUSINESSES
IN THE PPP 5 (2020) (comparing banks’ statements that the government instructed them to “go to
their existing customer base” to Treasury and SBA denial of this report).
112. Ruth Simon, Peter Rudegeair & Amara Omeokwe, The Rush for $350 Billion in Small-Business Loans
Starts Friday. Banks Have Questions., WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-rush-for350-billion-in-small-business-loans-starts-friday-banks-have-questions-11585828455 [https://perma.cc
/2W2L-28UX].
113. Ruth Simon & Peter Rudegeair, In Race for Small-Business Loans, Winning Hinged on Where
Firms Bank, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-race-for-small-businessloans-winning-hinged-on-where-firms-bank-11587410421 [https://perma.cc/L224-W9U6].
114. Plaintiff’s Original Petition at 7–8, DNM Contracting, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.
20-cv-01790 (S.D. Tex. filed Apr. 24, 2020). The petition alleged that a defendant bank made
misrepresentations to many small business owners that they would assist them with their PPP
loan applications and submit them for approval. “Defendant . . . intentionally fail[ed] to process
Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ . . . applications. Defendant chose favorites and ‘bigger businesses’
to receive funding and actually process their applications—to the detriment of Plaintiff and Class
Members.” Id. This case was submitted to arbitration in December 2020. See Katie Buehler, Wells
Fargo Gets Contractor’s PPP Claims Sent to Arbitration, LAW360 (Dec. 18, 2020), https://
www.law360.com/articles/1339350/wells-fargo-gets-contractor-s-ppp-claims-sent-to-arbitration
[https://perma.cc/8XXV-LRXV]; see also, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 5–6, BSJA, Inc. v. Wells
Fargo & Co., No. 20-cv-03588 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2020) (alleging that Wells Fargo favored larger
clients in violation of a first-come, first-served queue principle).
115. Private actors, sometimes called the fifth branch of government, have less strict
constitutional constraints compared to the government, including the government’s fourthbranch administrators. See Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators
and Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 183–85 (1989). Abramson included “formally
deputized private regulators,” organizations with some governmental connections, as fifth-branch
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B. Shake Shacked: April 2020
What happened next is less theorized in the academic literature. 116
It involved another development outside the government—this time,
from the media. The press discovered that the PPP had “allowed big
chains like Shake Shack, Potbelly and Ruth’s Chris Steak House to get
tens of millions of dollars while many smaller restaurants walked away
with nothing.” 117 Politicians with connections to beneficiaries like auto
dealerships faced adverse publicity.118 Shake Shack gave back its $10
million loan. 119 Gatekeeper advisors began to warn firms to take the
program’s “hardship” certification more seriously and consider the
possible adverse publicity consequences of being “Shake Shacked.”120
Some eligible firms presumably didn’t apply for or accept PPP
forgivable loans because of these concerns. 121 Thus another privateactor factor—media attention—affected patterns of compliance with
the law.
Often, the familiar pattern of well-resourced groups taking
advantage of regulatory guidance goes unnoticed. In contrast, people
noticed what happened with the PPP’s first, $349 billion wave. They
noticed that it was exhausted within a few weeks. And they noticed that
forgivable loans went disproportionately and in larger amounts to
businesses with resources like established banking relationships.
This “Shake Shacked” phase is an unusual feature of the PPP story.
Ordinarily, few notice aggressive interpretations of many technical
categories and “purely private actors . . . having no formal connection with government.” Id. The
article emphasized the weak constitutional constraints applied to such actors. Id.
116. Some scholars have examined the interaction of media coverage and law in certain
circumstances. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 369, 422–23 (2019) (arguing that the “external accountability” mechanism of “public
disclosures” can help limit the actions of front-line regulatory monitors, including through public
attention and media coverage).
117. David Yaffe-Bellamy, ‘The Big Guys Get Bailed Out”: Restaurants Vie for Relief Funds, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/20/business/shake-shack-returning-loan-pppcoronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/WX53-NDR8].
118. Ledyard King & Nicholas Wu, Auto Dealers, Restaurants with Ties to Lawmakers Were Among the Firms
That Got PPP Loans: Treasury/SBA Data, USA TODAY (July 7, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/politics/2020/07/06/ppp-loans-firms-tied-lawmakers-among-those-getting-pandemic-aid/5382594002/
[https://perma.cc/22V5-46RU].
119. Heather Hadden & Bob Davis, Shake Shack to Return $10 Million Coronavirus Stimulus Loan,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/shake-shack-to-return-10-millioncoronavirus-stimulus-loan-11587385439 [https://perma.cc/4PW7-85TC].
120. Bruce Brumberg, Paycheck Protection Loan Backlash: How to Defend Your Business Reputation
and Avoid Getting Shake Shacked, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/brucebrumberg/2020/04/27/paycheck-protection-loan-backlash-how-to-defend-your-businessreputation-and-avoid-getting-shake-shacked/?sh=4e0118037330 [https://perma.cc/7V73-RL3V].
121. Cororaton & Rosen, supra note 107, at 3 (observing that the stock market apparently
interpreted public firm PPP borrowing in the second wave of the program as a negative signal and
suggesting that this discouraged firms from borrowing since public firm participation was
significantly lower in the second round).
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provisions of law. 122 Interest group theory acknowledges that it is
possible for concentrated interest groups to claim benefits when the
costs imposed on others are not only diffuse, but also go unnoticed.123
Aggressive positions are often established quietly, without the public
taking any notice.
But in this case, in contrast, interest group standard operating
procedure was exposed to public view. Lists of companies who
successfully applied were widely available. 124 It was clear that the betterresourced applicants had won. The media attention meant that some
successful applicants had to accept public criticism along with their
PPP loan money.
On one hand, the criticism heaped onto companies like Shake
Shack, Potbelly, and others was understandable. The PPP’s public
relations headline was about helping small business, and larger chains
had crowded out smaller businesses in the initial free-for-all race. 125 On
the other hand, most of the larger businesses who successfully applied
for PPP funds probably technically complied with the text of the statute.
The “Shake Shacked” media attention introduced a new
consideration into the decision factors of potential PPP applicants. This
was the possibility of adverse publicity. This changed the prior
approach of interpreting a statute in a formal and technical fashion to
serve the interests of a business. An applicant who adopted a more
aggressive position when making a hardship certification might be
more exposed to adverse publicity. A company more prominent or more
protective of its reputation would be more interested in avoiding
adverse publicity.
Media attention, in other words, introduced a clientele effect 126 that
operated alongside the tendency of the PPP to favor well-resourced

122. See WENDY WAGNER, INCOMPREHENSIBLE! 6–7 (2019) (explaining that regulation
implementation is often incomprehensible to its target audience, giving the example of excessively
complicated disclosure, and arguing that this allows powerful interests subject to regulation to
exploit the regulatory process).
123. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
BUSINESS PREDICAMENT 135, 142 (James W. McKie ed., 1974) (“[A] small, relatively homogeneous
beneficiary group can make substantial gains by imposing unobtrusive costs on large numbers of
others.”).
124. See, e.g., Inti Pacheco & Theo Francis, Public Companies Got $500 Million in Small Business
Loans, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/these-are-the-public-companiesthat-got-small-business-loans-11587493742 [https://perma.cc/6UNS-79US] (listing 203 public
companies).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 88–92 (summarizing empirical studies showing largerbusiness and bank-client bias in PPP first wave).
126. The idea of a clientele effect is that certain kinds of investors are drawn to certain kinds
of securities because of investor characteristics rather than because of the price or value of the
securities. For instance, some investors may prefer dividend-paying securities because they want a
stream of dividend checks as income. As used here, “clientele effect” means that certain kinds of
PPP applicants would be more likely to apply for PPP funding because of applicant-specific
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applicants. An applicant less concerned about its reputation and/or
more willing to argue with the government about PPP eligibility would
be more likely to apply for a PPP grant. An applicant more averse to the
risks of audit and adverse publicity would be less likely to apply.
Available data tend to confirm the existence of a clientele effect.
One study finds not only that more financially secure firms were more
likely to return PPP grants but also that, controlling for other variables,
health industry firms were more likely to return such grants. 127 The
authors suggest that this is in part because health industry firms care
more about their reputation, particularly with respect to the
government, since they must frequently interact with government
agencies on regulatory questions such as drug approval. They also find
that returning funds often had a positive effect on a firm’s stock price,
which indicates that reputational risk such as a possible government
investigation is indeed costly for some firms.128
C. The Second Wave: Regulation, April – August 2020
The first wave of PPP funding revealed the core problem of
allocation. Assuming a limited emergency fund, some mechanism will
triage or order applicants. The government or other fund administrator
might determine the order of priority, or the market might determine
this order. In the first wave, private actors—applicants and banks—
solved the allocation problem while they scrambled for funds as their
resources would permit, held back by little other than broad eligibility
requirements and an unevenly experienced concern about adverse
publicity.
The second wave started when Congress added $310 billion of
funding, for a total of $659 billion. 129 Then, the story began to shift as
bureaucrats took action. Administrative “sure shipwreck” and “safe
harbor” guidance modified the first wave free-for-all. As additional
funding gave Treasury and the SBA some room to work with, they
began to regulate and take more control over allocating the program’s
limited resources.

characteristics, such as a relative indifference to reputation costs. Cf. Henry T.C. Hu, Buffett,
Corporate Objectives, and the Nature of Sheep, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 379, 394 (1997) (noting a “clientele
effect” that “encourage[s] self-selection” for Berkshire Hathaway shareholders).
127. Balyuk et al., supra note 90, at 22–23, 66 tbl.VII.
128. See id.
129. Erica Werner & Seung Min Kim, Senate Passes $484 Billion Bill That Would Expand Small-business
Aid, Boost Money for Hospitals and Testing, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/us-policy/2020/04/21/congress-coronavirus-small-business/ [https://perma.cc/8EG8-PRHE].
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One early piece of guidance aimed to discourage public company
PPP applications. It was the following FAQ, posted April 23, 2020, and
published April 28, 2020, in the Federal Register:
Question: Do businesses owned by large companies with
adequate sources of liquidity to support the business’s ongoing
operations qualify for a PPP loan?
Answer: . . . Although the CARES Act suspends the ordinary
requirement that borrowers must be unable to obtain credit
elsewhere . . . borrowers must still certify in good faith that
their PPP loan request is necessary. . . . For example, it is
unlikely that a public company with substantial market value
and access to capital markets will be able to make the required
certification in good faith, and such a company should be prepared
to demonstrate to the SBA, upon request, the basis for its
certification. . . . Any borrower that applied for a PPP loan prior
to the issuance of this guidance and repays the loan in full . . .
will be deemed by the SBA to have made the required
certification in good faith.130
According to the SBA, this provision acted as a safe harbor for
public firms that received PPP loans but then returned them. 131 A safe
harbor typically is a legal provision providing that particular facts
comply with the law and will result in no penalty, while leaving the
compliance status of other facts to be judged by a standard.132
Returning the money would provide protection against enforcement, a
typical safe harbor result.
A contrasting element was the audit threat, italicized in the FAQ
language above, that a public company should be prepared to explain
itself and its certification to the SBA. This language suggests that
administrators intended this provision to act not only as a safe harbor,
but also prospectively as a sure shipwreck. 133 That is, the audit threat
130. PPP: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 86, at 12 (published Apr. 23, 2020)
(emphasis added).
131. See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection ProgramRequirements-Promissory Notes, Authorizations, Affiliation, and Eligibility, 85 Fed. Reg. 23,450,
23,451–52 (Apr. 28, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 120–21) (providing “limited safe harbor” in
Federal Register for businesses that gave back funds by May 7, 2020); Business Loan Program
Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—Requirements—Extension of Limited Safe
Harbor with Respect to Certification Concerning Need for PPP Loan Request, 85 Fed. Reg. 29,845,
29,846 (May 19, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120) (extending safe harbor deadline to May 14,
2020).
132. Susan Morse, Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1385, 1391–92 (2016)
(defining safe harbors).
133. See id. (defining sure shipwrecks).
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suggested that certain conduct—applying for the PPP while having
public-company status—might violate the law. The provision aimed not
only to encourage previous public company applicants to give funds
back, but also to discourage future public company applicants from
asking for any PPP funds in the first place.
The effort to cut public firms out of the PPP worked to some extent.
First, it encouraged firms to return funds. A study of public firm PPP
loans reports that of the 812 public firms that received PPP loans, 110,
including Shake Shack, returned them. 134 Public companies received
$2.2 billion in grants between April and August 2020 and returned $600
million, making the net grant total $1.6 billion. 135
Additionally, the guidance discouraged new applications from
public firms. One analysis suggests that out of a group of 1,741 public
firms that were eligible for PPP loans, about 700 received grants. 136 The
majority received grants in the first two weeks of the program. 137
Another study suggests that only thirty percent of the loans made to
public companies were made in the second round of the program,
starting in late April 2020. 138 Further, one list reports that just twentytwo public company loans were made on or after May 18, 2020. 139 This
suggests that the “sure shipwreck” audit threat guidance had a chilling
effect with respect to PPP public company loans.
The second key piece of guidance released in April 2020 related to
the size of PPP loans rather than the type of PPP borrower. It also used

134. Cororaton & Rosen, supra note 107, at 10 (reporting that 812 public firms received loans
and 110 returned them).
135. Cororaton & Rosen, supra note 107, at 10, 11 tbl.1 (finding that 13.5% of public company
borrowers returned funds and that the total loan amount to public firms was $2.2 billion gross and
$1.6 billion net of returns).
136. Id. at 21 tbl.3 (finding that out of 1741 firms in subsample, 701 received PPP loans).
137. Id. at 28 tbl.5 (finding that out of 618 public PPP borrowers analyzed, 353 had borrowed by
April 16).
138. One study used 347 loan observations, of which 245 were first-round, totaling about $885
million and 102 second-round loans, totaling $240 billion. See Ran Duchin, Xiumin Martin, Roni
Michaely & Ivy Wang, Concierge Treatment from Banks: Evidence from the Paycheck Protection
Program 33 (Mar. 10, 2021) (unpublished paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3775276 (“[W]ithin a set
of comparable firms, relationship lending in the syndicated loan market increases the likelihood of
obtaining a PPP loan by a striking 57%”). This analysis reveals relative numbers of first-wave and
second-wave loans, although the total number of public-company loans was larger. See Cororaton
& Rosen, supra note 107, at 11 (showing 812 public borrowers and 13.5%, or 110 borrowers,
returning).
139. SEC Filings: Public Companies Receiving SBA PPP Loans Under the CARES Act, FACTSQUARED,
https://factba.se/sba-loans [https://perma.cc/7978-NLXP] (showing that two out of these twentytwo loans were later returned). This list appears to undercount the total number of loans, as it
reports less than 400 public companies’ loans (net of returns) compared to about 800 reported
elsewhere. See Cororaton & Rosen, supra note 107, at 11 tbl.1 (showing 812 public borrowers). But
even if there were twice the FactSquared figure of twenty public company loans after May 18, 2020,
it still represents a steep decline in public company applications following the sure shipwreck
guidance. See id.
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an enforcement tactic, this time to discourage loans in excess of $2
million. Initially the guidance promised audits for larger loans. It
explained that “the SBA has decided . . . that it will review all loans in
excess of $2 million . . . .” 140 Later guidance promised no audit for
smaller loans. It reads: “Any borrower that, together with its affiliates,
received PPP loans with an original principal amount of less than $2
million will be deemed to have made the required certification
concerning the necessity of the loan request in good faith.” 141
This safe harbor guidance technically did not prohibit anyone from
applying for a larger grant. It simply specified how the SBA and
Treasury allocated enforcement resources away from loans of $2
million or less. But the guidance nevertheless—and predictably—had a
big impact.
PPP reports show that loan size decreased over the course of the
program. After May, there were no increases in the number of loans
greater than $2 million.142 More granular data also show a reduction in
the number of loans larger than $150,000 following closely after the
release of the April 29, 2020, guidance. 143 This is a remarkable change in
the population of PPP beneficiaries, accomplished quickly after the
release of the safe harbor guidance. The mere absence of a safe harbor
no-audit guarantee for larger loans was enough to transform the
composition of the program.
D. The Third Wave: Smaller Still and Sector-Specific
Grants under the program were transformed further still by the
December 2020 statute, which endorsed the agencies’ size-related
140. PPP: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 86, at 13.
141. Id. at 16 (published May 13, 2020) (footnote omitted). This safe harbor (but not the earlier
promise of audit for larger loans) was incorporated into the SBA’s interim final rule compendium
some months later. See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program
as Amended by Economic Aid Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 3692, 3706 & n.87 (Jan. 14, 2021) (to be codified at 13
C.F.R. pts. 113, 120–21).
142. Compare PPP REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH MAY 2021, supra note 2, at 6 (reporting 24,857 loans
between $2 million and $5 million and 4,840 loans above $5 million), with U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM (PPP) REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH 06/30/2020, at 6 (2020), https://
home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/PPP-Results-Sunday.pdf [https://perma.cc/L77B-MAMQ]
(reporting 24,838 loans between $2 million and $5 million and 4,840 loans above $5 million), and U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM (PPP) REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH 08/08/2020, at
6 (2020), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/SBA-Paycheck-Protection-Program-Loan-ReportRound2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GVC2-G4UC] [hereinafter PPP REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH AUGUST
2020] (reporting 24,248 loans between $2 million and $5 million and 4,734 loans above $5 million). The
return of some larger loans contributed to the reduction in the number of such loans outstanding. Id.
143. See PPP Data, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/funding-programs/loans
/coronavirus-relief-options/paycheck-protection-program/ppp-data#section-header-2 (last visited
Sept. 25, 2021) (select “Download all PPP data in CSV format” under “All Data”; then select “Download”
from the “Explore” button to the right of the file “public_150k_plus_210630.csv”).
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restrictions on grants by adding a $2 million limit to the statute for
second-draw loans. 144 Congress also reduced the employee limit to 300
for these loans, 145 endorsing the idea that funds should be directed to
smaller firms.
The December 2020 and January 2021 statutes also added other
provisions about eligible firms not directly correlated with size. One
was sector-specific. For instance, amounts were allocated in related
provisions for closed performance venues and restaurants. 146 Another
provision may have sought to identify intermediate firms who would
survive if allowed a PPP grant. This was the December 2020 provision
that required second-draw PPP applicants to show at least a twenty-five
percent reduction in gross receipts when comparing similar quarters in
2019 and 2020. 147
The statutory modifications through December 2020 appear to
have resulted from developments in the program more than from a
change in partisan views. Elected officials in the White House and each
house of Congress remained through 2020, but the PPP evolved
nevertheless.
After the Biden administration was in place in 2021, it made further
modifications to the program. These included a dedicated two-week
application window for businesses with fewer than twenty employees
in February and March 2021. 148 Biden administration guidance also
expanded eligibility for applicants with criminal histories, excluding
fraud, and eliminated consideration of whether an applicant had
defaulted on federal student loans from a decision on an application. 149
Another key question for the statute and for administrative
guidance involved the terms of forgiveness. The terms of forgiveness
also became clearer by the third wave.
Administrative guidance on forgiveness sometimes leaned toward
leniency. For instance, a rule allowed a borrower to avoid recording a
reduction in force (which can limit borrowers’ ability to obtain

144. 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(37)(C)(i).
145. § 636(a)(37)(A)(iv)(I)(aa). The hospitality business physical-location rule and the rule
waiving affiliation rules for some businesses remained unchanged. See § 636(a)(D)(iv).
146. See supra notes 59, 65–66 (citing allocations to shuttered performance venues and
restaurants in December 2020 and January 2021 statutes).
147. § 636(a)(37)(A)(iv)(I)(bb) (also providing rules applicable to entities not in business for all
of 2019).
148. Release No. 21-17, supra note 11.
149. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—Revisions
to Loan Amount Calculation and Eligibility, 86 Fed. Reg. 13,149, 13,154–55 (Mar. 8, 2021) (to be
codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120) (removing one-year lookback restriction for “non-financial fraud
felonies” and eliminating consideration of delinquency or default with respect to federal student
loans).
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forgiveness) if a laid-off employee refused a rehiring offer. 150 In other
cases, it was stricter. For example, a rule required seventy-five percent
of a grant amount to be used for payroll even though the statute did not
require this allocation. 151 In many other cases, it has been carefully
technical, such as transposing a rule that an employee’s compensation
may not exceed $100,000 annually to situations involving seasonal
employment. 152
Statutory changes have generally loosened restrictions. This was
particularly true of the PPP Flexibility Act enacted in June. This statute
reduced the regulatory requirement that a portion of grants must be
used for payroll costs, from seventy-five percent to sixty percent. 153 It
also increased the timeframe for using loan proceeds, from eight weeks
to twenty-four weeks. 154 Later, the December 2020 statute further
relaxed some requirements, including by adding further allowed
expenses, such as worker protection expenses like drive-through
windows. 155 The December 2020 statute also authorized a simple onepage forgiveness process for loans of $150,000 or less.156
E. Government Data Show Smaller Loans over Time
Government data about loan size show the evolution of the PPP
over time. It confirms that loan size under the PPP was noticeably
larger for loan approvals made during the first two weeks of the
program. Then the loans got smaller, initially under the second wave
from April to August 2020, and then smaller still with the third wave of
disbursements made in 2021.

150. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—
Requirements—Loan Forgiveness, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,004, 33,007 (June 1, 2020) (to be codified at 13
C.F.R. pt. 120) (explaining why the rule disregarding refusals of reemployment offers was de
minimis).
151. Id. at 33,007 (“[T]he Administrator notes that the 25 percent cap on nonpayroll costs will
avoid excessive inclusion of nonpayroll costs.”).
152. See PPP: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 86, at 14 (published May 3, 2020).
153. Paycheck Protection Flexibility Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-142, § 3, 134 Stat. 641, 642
(2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636m) (requiring usage of sixty percent of loan amount for payroll
costs).
154. See id. § 3, 134 Stat. at 641 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(A)(iii)) (extending covered
period to end as late as December 31, 2020); Business Loan Program Temporary Changes;
Paycheck Protection Program—Requirements—Revisions to Loan Forgiveness and Loan Review
Procedures Interim Final Rules, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,304, 38,307 (June 26, 2020) (to be codified at 13
C.F.R. pt. 120).
155. Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses, Nonprofits, and Venues Act, Pub. L. No. 116260, § 304, 134 Stat. 1993, 1993 (2020) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)) (listing additional
allowed covered expenses).
156. See id. § 307 (providing for one-page form that requires information about number of
retained employees, estimated amount of loan spent on payroll, and total loan value).
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Of the $247.5 billion in PPP grants reported by the SBA through
April 13, 2020, $37.2 billion, or about 15% of the total, was distributed in
amounts of $150,000 or less. 157 In contrast, by April 13, 2020, $115.3
billion, or about 47% of the total, was comprised of loans in excess of $1
million. 158 The average loan size was about $239,000.159
In the second wave of the program, PPP loans trended smaller.
Data released August 8, 2020, provide an idea of the composition of
loans made during the program’s second wave. Of the $277.5 billion
increase in the net dollars disbursed between April 13, 2020, and August
8, 2020, 160 $110.3 billion, 161 or about 40% of the increase, was allocated to
loans of $150,000 or less, while $63.9 billion, 162 or about 23% of the
increase, was allocated to loans in excess of $1 million. Not all of the
changes in net dollar amounts relate to new grants, since, for instance,
some large loans were returned, which also affected the calculation of
net dollars disbursed. Nevertheless, the data show that loan size
decreased in the second wave as compared to the first. After the second
wave disbursements, the average loan size, considering both first and
second wave loans, was $101,000.163
In the third wave of the program, PPP loans continued the trend
toward smaller amounts. In 2021, about 50% of the $277.7 billion of net
dollars disbursed came from loans of $150,000 or under, while about

157. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM (PPP) REPORT: APPROVALS
THROUGH 4/13/2020 4 (2020), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/PPP%20Report%
20SBA%204.14.20%20%20-%20%20Read-Only.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VL3-CT9M].
158. Id. at 2, 4.
159. See id. at 4.
160. See PPP REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH AUGUST 2020, supra note 142, at 2 (reporting
approximately $525 billion approved); PPP REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH 4/13/20, supra note 2, at 2
(reporting $247.5 billion approved). The difference between the two figures for total net dollars
approved is $277.5 billion.
161. See PPP REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH AUGUST 2020, supra note 142, at 6 (reporting $62.7
billion approved for loans of $50,000 and under, $48.7 billion approved for loans of $50,000 to
$100,000, and $36.1 billion approved for loans of $100,000 – $150,000, for a total of $147.5 billion);
PPP REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH 4/13/20, supra note 157, at 4 (reporting $37.2 billion approved for
loans of $150,000 and under). The difference between the two figures for loans of $150,000 or less,
$147.5 billion minus $37.2 billion, is $110.3 billion.
162. See PPP REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH AUGUST 2020, supra note 142, at 6 (reporting $73.9
billion approved for loans of $1 million to $2 million, $72.2 billion approved for loans of $2 million
to $5 million, and $33.1 billion approved for loans over $5 million, for a total of $179.2 billion); PPP
REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH 4/13/20, supra note 157, at 6 (reporting $43.3 billion approved for loans
of $1 million to $2 million, $49.3 billion approved for loans of $2 million to $5 million, and $22.8
billion approved for loans over $5 million, for a total of about $115.3 billion). The difference between
the two figures, $179.2 billion and $115.3 billion, for loans in excess of $1 million is $63.9 billion.
163. PPP REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH AUGUST 2020, supra note 142, at 6 (reporting overall
average loan size of $101,000).
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16% came from loans in excess of $1 million. 164 The average loan size was
$42,000. 165
In other words, at first PPP loans went out in larger amounts, and
then in smaller and smaller amounts. At the start, almost half of the
PPP loans were in amounts in excess of $1 million, and about 15% in
amounts of $150,000 or less. 166 By the end, these data points had
flipped. About half the loan amounts in 2021 were in amounts of
$150,000 or less, and 16% in amounts in excess of $1 million.167 Similarly,
in the first wave, the average loan size was $239,000. 168 By contrast, the
average loan in the third wave was $42,000.169
F. Changes in Racial Disparities over Time
The progress of the PPP over time also showed changes in the
structural bias of the program, including with respect to racial
disparities in the distribution of PPP funds. In the first wave of the
program, businesses owned by white people were more likely to receive
PPP funds. This has been attributed to a difference in existing banking
relationships. 170
The first wave PPP racial disparities were striking. For instance,
counties with all white-owned businesses received about 0.27 loans per
employer, compared to about 0.15 loans per employer in counties with
less than 55% white businesses.171 Data comparing PPP grants in
majority-white versus majority-Black congressional districts also reveal
first wave disparities. 172 Also, concurrently with the first PPP funding
wave, businesses owned by people of color closed at a greater rate than
white-owned businesses. 173 On the metric of racial disparities, the PPP
had a poor start.

164. PPP REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH MAY 2021, supra note 2, at 6 (reporting overall average
loan size of $42,000).
165. Id. at 2, 6 (reporting 2021 net dollars approved of $277.7 billion, $139.9 billion loaned in
increments of $150,000 or less, $43.6 billion loaned in increments of more than $1 million).
166. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
170. Whether the government encouraged applications based on existing relationships is a
matter of dispute. See STAFF OF SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS, 116TH CONG., supra
note 111, at 5 (comparing banks’ statements that the government instructed them to “go to their
existing customer base” to Treasury and SBA denial of this report).
171. See Fairlie & Fossen, supra note 101, at 13 (showing relationship weighted by population in
Figure 7).
172. Grotto et al., supra note 100.
173. See, e.g., Misera, supra note 96, at 2–3 (noting that Black-owned, Hispanic-owned, and
Asian-owned businesses closed at a higher rate than white-owned businesses).
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In the second wave of the program, these disparities were reduced.
By June, congressional districts with non-Hispanic white majorities,
which contain 77% of the total small business owners, had received 78%
of loans (down from 83% in early April). 174 One study shows that in July,
there were about 0.26 loans per employer establishment in counties
with no minority-owned businesses and about 0.46 loans per employer
establishment in counties with more than 45% minority-owned
businesses. 175 This reverses the order of the data from the first half of
April. 176
The data show lasting racial disparity for the PPP as a whole. 177 One
study, based on ZIP code level-data and holding constant PPP eligibility
levels, concludes that a 10% increase in Black population correlates with
a 1.3% decrease in uptake of PPP loans. 178 Another study notes that,
overall (and controlling for number of employees though not size of
payroll) Black business owners secured PPP loans that were 14–16%
smaller than the benchmark of borrowers who did not disclose their
race. 179 It would not be right to claim that the PPP shed its structural
bias. But data do suggest that the racial disparities decreased over time.
There are several candidates for the mechanism for this change.
One possibility is that the passage of time alone helped to alleviate
the initial bias, because it took time for businesspeople of color to learn
about the program.180 Another possibility is that regulatory program

174. Id.
175. Fairlie & Fossen, supra note 101, at 13.
176. Id. at 12 (showing relationship weighted by population in Figure 6).
177. Other smaller studies are also revealing. In one, sixty-three matched pairs of borrowers
visited bank branches to apply for PPP loans from April 27 – May 29, 2020. ANNELIESE LEDERER &
SARA OROS, NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., LENDING DISCRIMINATION WITHIN THE PAYCHECK
P ROTECTION P ROGRAM 4 (2020), https://www.ncrc.org/lending-discrimination-within-thepaycheck-protection-program/ [https://perma.cc/5VSX-NX54]. The study reports that in fortythree percent of cases, white testers received more favorable treatment. See id. at 14 (showing
differences in PPP information provided by banks based on race and gender of applicants).
Another study, based on interview data, gives voice to the challenges faced by applicants for PPP
funding without strong banker support. See Karina Santellano, Compounded Inequality: How the U.S.
Paycheck Protection Program Is Failing Los Angeles Latino Small Businesses, 44 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD.
794, 799 (2021) (recounting interview with small business owner who reported that bank gave her
company “the runaround”).
178. Wang & Zhang, supra note 69, at 10 (finding that ZIP codes with a 10% higher proportion
of Black population have a 1.3% lower take-up rate of PPP loans).
179. See Atkins et al., supra note 102, at 15, 20 (using dependent variable of natural log of loan
amount and controlling for variables including number of employees, though not for amount of
payroll).
180. Businesspeople of color are more likely to own smaller businesses. See Sifan Liu & Joseph
Parilla, Businesses Owned by Women and Minorities Have Grown. Will COVID-19 Undo That?,
BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/businesses-owned-bywomen-and-minorities-have-grown-will-covid-19-undo-that/
[https://perma.cc/2PD5-LRXX]
(providing data about number of employees and revenues). Small businesses in turn were more
likely to take more time to learn about the PPP. See Humphries et al., supra note 95, at 3 (reporting
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changes helped to alleviate racial disparities. For instance, about a
month into the program, community financial institutions and online
fintech lenders were authorized as lenders. 181 Online fintech lenders
extended loans disproportionately to businesses owned by people of
color. 182 Although it is hard to say whether expanding lenders to include
fintech was prompted by information about racial disparities or caused
the reduction in racial disparities as the PPP progressed, it is clear that
fintech lender involvement increased and racial disparities decreased
in the later stages of the program. Both trends are consistent with the
idea of a program with a learning curve.
III. THE PPP AS AN EMERGENCY FUND PARADIGM
A. Incomplete Instructions
When the PPP arrived at the doorstep of Treasury and the SBA, it
came with the problem of how to allocate limited funds. So long as the
applications from eligible applicants exceeded $349 billion—which they
quickly did—the program required priorities. Congress did not include
clear instructions on how to solve this allocation problem. At the same
time, the program anticipated that funding would begin immediately.
This meant initially proceeding in the absence of information about
who would apply for the program and in what amounts.
As others have observed, legislatures are likely to produce
underspecified emergency fund statutes that allow administrators to
work out the details of allocation. 183 This suggests that emergency fund
on delay in PPP -knowledge among small businesses based on survey evidence from April and May
2020).
181. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg.
26,324, 26,325 (May 4, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120) (authorizing “non-banks” and “noninsured depository institutions” as PPP lenders).
182. See Isel Erel & Jack Liebersohn, Does Fintech Substitute for Banks? Evidence from the Paycheck
Protection Program 52–53 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27659, 2020), https://
www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27659/w27659.pdf [https://perma.cc/NUX7-78KP]
(showing negative correlations between white percentage of population and portion of PPP lending
extended through online or fintech lenders); Sabrina T. Howell, Theresa Kuchler & Johannes Stroebel,
Which Lenders Had the Highest Minority Share Among Their Payment Protection Program (PPP)
Loans? 4 (Dec. 10, 2020) (unpublished paper), https://www.smefinanceforum.org/sites/default/files
/NYU%20Research%20Note.pdf [https://perma.cc/77RV-XB3N] (finding that fintech lenders were
important intermediaries for loans to Black and Hispanic-owned businesses both because of the high
volume of fintech loans and because of the higher proportion of fintech loans made to Black and
Hispanic businesses).
183. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1614. The authors studied U.S. crisis governance in
context of the 9/11 attacks and in context of the 2008 global financial crisis and found that “[i]n the
modern administrative state, it is practically inevitable that legislators, judges and the public will
entrust the executive branch with sweeping power to manage serious crises of this sort.” Id.
Administrators exercise power both by implementing salient statutes like the PPP law and by more
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law will often be left to agencies or to private actors to produce the law
in its practical, on-the-ground translation. The PPP experience
emphasizes that private actors determine the allocation of funds if
administrators do not do so.
This Article assumes that fund administrators have an important
role to play in distributing emergency funds. Parts IV and V outline
back-end-adjustment and descending-order-of-necessity distribution
tactics suggested by the experience of the PPP. These are offered as
tools that might help fund administrators advance the policy goals of
the emergency fund.
When fund administrators are administrative agencies, their
administrative tools are most useful if administrators are charged with
pursuing an earnest, although underspecified, legislative policy goal. In
other words, the tools assume a statute’s vague emergency fund
instructions mean to pursue the goal of alleviating the emergency, even
though legislators are reluctant to provide detailed distribution
instructions for the fund. This Section III.A gives some reasons why
this assumption of earnest policymaking is likely to be correct, even
though the statute’s instructions are incomplete.
One reason for incomplete instructions is that legislators may agree
that an emergency needs to be addressed, but they have not reached a
consensus about the right approach to distribution. Perhaps specific
policy preferences are contingent upon future developments unknown
at the moment of enactment. 184 Or perhaps a vague statute papers over
disagreements with the intention that agencies will resolve them. 185
Even if legislators are somewhat more self-interested, rather than
simply uncertain, they still may intend for the agency to make a goodfaith attempt to sensibly distribute funds. For instance, legislators may
wish to avoid direct responsibility for the inevitably unpopular
decisions about distribution. 186 They may want a careful distribution
process, but prefer to avoid blame for those who object to it. Legislators
pass the buck to the agency, so that the agency draws any criticism.187
under-the-radar means. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi, Quinn Curtis & Andrew T. Hayashi, Crisis-Driven
Tax Law: The Case of Section 382, 23 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 6–7 (2019) (explaining technical IRS and Treasury
actions that responded to financial crisis by expanding loss allowance rules).
184. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1644 (“[E]x ante legal rules cannot regulate crises
in advance, because unanticipated events will invariably arise”).
185. See William Eskridge, Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 756, 767–68
(2012) (explaining how the U.S. pluralist legislative process and features such as committee and
floor procedures provide opportunities to smooth over differences with vague language and leave
“agencies, not legislators, [to] make controversial decisions”).
186. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 9 (1999) (“Legislators
will prefer to make policy themselves as long as the political benefits they derive from doing so
outweigh the political costs; otherwise, they will delegate to the executive.”).
187. Morris P. Fiorina, Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy: A Mismatch of Incentives and
Capabilities, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 332, 343 (Lawrence Dodd & Bruce Oppenheimer eds., 2d
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Or, legislators may hope that the agency’s opaque and expert decisionmaking will be accepted in the same way that the public often accepts
the opaque decisions reached by a jury. 188 Both of these ideas are
consistent with the idea that an agency should do its best to distribute
emergency funds consistent with a good-faith effort to discern the
objective of the statute.
So long as the agency is expected to pursue a good-faith
distribution policy consistent with the apparent intent of a statute, the
arguments of this Article have clear relevance. But perhaps legislatures
expect agencies to deviate from the stated public policy objectives of a
statute. Perhaps the legislature intentionally sets up an administrative
process that favors certain actors to ensure administrative results that
will favor those actors. 189 The legislature need not specify the desired
result, because the favored interests will assume the responsibility of
ensuring that the administrative result advances their cause.190 Also,
legislators may publicly support some other public policy not in line
with favored interests’ preferences.
Under this theory, legislation can have a dual purpose. One purpose
allows legislators to claim the satisfaction of goals with popular appeal.
The other purpose anticipates that administrators will interpret the
legislation in a way that favors the special interests that legislators also
wish to please.
This dual-purpose idea suggests that legislators may publicly
support the general public interest, but privately, through the
mechanism of administrative procedure, favor private interests. The
dual-purpose idea can apply when administrative process blocks the
implementation of a long, complicated, and self-contradictory statute.
That is, even if a statute’s headline appears to pursue one goal, its
underlying provisions may be so convoluted that administrative
agencies will be slow to implement them—thus producing a lack of

ed. 1981) (“Why take political chances by setting detailed regulations sure to antagonize some
political actor or another? . . . Let the agency take the blame and the member of Congress the
credit.”).
188. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 19, 57–67 (1978) (distinguishing
between first-order decisions about how much resource to provide and second-order decisions
about how to allocate the resource and explaining the tactic of delegating allocation to agencies or
experts as analogous to the acceptance of jury decisions in American law).
189. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 254 (1987) (articulating theory that
legislatures can determine the control of administrative results by setting administrative process).
190. See id. at 244 (“[P]rocedural controls . . . enable political leaders to assure compliance
without specifying, or even necessarily knowing, what substantive outcome is most in their
interest.”).
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regulation that satisfies a different, even opposite, goal as compared to
the stated aim of the legislation. 191
This dual-purpose idea could also be relevant in the emergency
fund PPP case, when the statute is brief and vague. For example,
perhaps Congress anticipated that Treasury and the SBA would choose
a path that benefited private interests, such as the interests of the
intermediary banks and the banks’ preferred clients. Maybe Congress
meant for agencies to follow the interests of the banks, avoid
regulation, and use a first-come, first-served approach. The
government’s initial refusal to make the hardship certification a
meaningful prerequisite allowed banks to act to benefit their favored
clients, without the interference of government priorities. 192 Perhaps
Congress intended both to appear to support the smallest businesses
and actually to accomplish, through the inaction of Treasury and the
SBA, the different goal of directing funds to banks and their preferred
clients.
The dual-purpose theory may have purchase generally as an
explanation of some relationships between Congress and
administrative agencies, although some work indicates that agencies
can and do resist political control. 193 But even if Congress sometimes
successfully pursues dual purposes, this approach is less relevant in
emergencies. The reason is that legislators achieve their goals under the
dual-purpose theory through deception. For the dual-purpose scheme
to work, not only must agency actions accomplish something different
than what the statute is said to stand for, but also the public must not
notice that the administrative result diverges from the stated purpose
of the statute. If the public notices that the statute says one thing and
does another, then the scheme will backfire.
Emergencies are salient to the public. This makes a difference for
the dual-purpose scheme, because the public is likely to be aware of how
the agency implements the statute. If the public knows what the
administrative answer is, then it can tell that the administrative answer
differs from the statutory promise. This foils the deception at the heart
of the dual-purpose idea. The PPP illustrates this through the “Shake

191. See WAGNER, supra note 122, at 231–32 (“[A] clever [legislative leader] can take this public
choice strategy further by tossing in a handful of favorable substantive provisions to appease the
thinly financed opposition. As long as the law is replete with contradictions and unresolved
complexities, it will likely face a long and tortured path during implementation, and the bones
thrown to the opposition will not materialize in practice.”).
192. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
193. See David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies,
28 J. LEG. STUD. 413, 445 (1999). The article presents an empirical study of decisions at the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission and concludes that procedural political control “leave[s]
substantive discretion unaffected, and . . . agencies have a multitude of ways to evade procedures
or to interpret them in ways that minimize their substantive impact.” Id.
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Shacked” phase of the PPP’s story, covered in Section II.B of this Article,
in which media articles sharply criticized large and/or public firms that
received PPP funds. Data points from other emergencies tend to
confirm that the public pays attention to agency distribution decisions
in emergency fund settings, 194 even if not in other circumstances.
Even if statutory vagueness might sometimes facilitate an intended
divergence between stated statutory purpose and administrative effect,
this dual-purpose deception is unlikely to succeed in an emergency
fund setting. It is also possible that both legislators and administrators
have a good-faith purpose and intend to pursue earnest, although
underspecified, legislative policy goals. In that case, the lessons in this
Article are an especially good fit, since they are designed to help
administrators focused on solving the policy problem of the tradeoff
between accuracy and speed in emergency fund distribution.
B. Enforcement Discretion
There is an active scholarly debate about whether administrative
agencies, like Treasury and the SBA, should be allowed to specify the
law when the legislature writes an underspecified statute, including in
an emergency. 195 One example offered is that of the 2008 Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP). Its statutory language allowed the
Secretary “to purchase . . . troubled assets from any financial
institution.” 196 In the legislative process, the Treasury presented the
program as one that would purchase troubled assets, such as loans from
banks. 197 But after the passage of the statute, Treasury instead followed
194. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 145–63 (describing criticism from many quarters over
administration of Gulf Coast Claims Facility following Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion and oil
spill); Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 531 (2009) (noting “public criticism” of federal Troubled Asset
Relief Program during the global financial crisis and release of “a scathing [Congressional]
report”).
195. Compare, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking,
Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1842 (2015) (“[U]northodox policymaking may
indeed advance . . . the legitimacy of government getting its work done.”), and Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 6, at 1640–41 (arguing, based on the work of Carl Schmitt, that legislatures act too slowly
to respond directly to a crisis, and that delegation of frontline emergency decisions to
administrators is inevitable), with Josh Blackman, Gridlock, 130 HARV. L. REV. 241, 270 (2016)
(arguing that Congressional silence with respect to details of contraceptive mandate under the
Affordable Care Act evidences a divided legislature and “demonstrates that Congress did not
intend for the agencies to exercise” the “awesome power” of “burden[ing] free exercise”), and
Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without Congress, 22 GEORGE MASON L. REV.
501, 504 (2015) (“[B]eyond ad-hoc judicial interventions, no serious doctrine exists that is
commensurate to the potential for effectively unchecked executive government.”).
196. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5211.
197. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 194, at 526 (describing legislative approval of purchase
of illiquid troubled assets from banks).
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emerging global best practices for intervention and purchased equity in
troubled financial firms. 198
Another example offered is that of the Affordable Care Act. Its
statutory language allowed tax credits when taxpayers enrolled
“through an Exchange established by the State.” 199 Other statutory
provisions explained that if a state did not create an exchange, a
federally established exchange would serve in its stead. 200 Many states
did not create exchanges, and many taxpayers enrolled through an
exchange established instead by the federal government. 201 Treasury
wrote guidance that allowed tax credits anyway. 202 The Supreme Court
declined to defer to Treasury’s administrative interpretation but
arrived at the same answer through an independent analysis of the
statute based on a “major question” exception to Chevron. 203
One lesson of the TARP and the Affordable Care Act is that the
authorizing statutory language shapes an agency’s discretion. Different
contexts or statutory language would offer different scopes of
discretion. Here, the terms of discretion under the PPP illustrate the
kind of leeway that an emergency fund administrator might have.
The PPP was clear on some things. Borrowers (grantees) would
apply for funds. They would have to meet the employee-threshold
requirements. They would have to provide calculations, for example,
based on their monthly payroll figures, to apply for a grant. They would
have to apply through a financial intermediary.
But the PPP was unclear on other points. Most importantly, it
required applicants to make the hardship certification “that the
uncertainty of current economic conditions makes necessary the loan
request to support the ongoing operations of the eligible recipient.”204
But the statute did not define terms like “current economic conditions,”
“necessary,” and “ongoing operations.” The lack of clarity about the

198. See id. at 525–29 (explaining shift to equity purchases); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at
1632–33 (“Critics . . . argue that . . . Treasury’s . . . decisions—to use TARP funds to buy equity rather
than toxic mortgage-related assets, and to use TARP funds to bail out automakers—show that the
[statute] wrote the executive a blank check. What those decisions really show, however, is just that
Treasury’s authority is broad . . . .”).
199. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1).
201. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 483 (2015).
202. 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2 (2020); 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2019) (including Exchanges “regardless of
whether the Exchange is established and operated by a State . . . or by HHS.”).
203. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. at 485–86, 492–98 (2015) (holding that the Court would
independently interpret the statute, that the statutory language was ambiguous, and that the
statutory scheme directed that federal-established exchanges should be included within it); see also
Gillian Metzger, Agencies, Polarization and the State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1779 (2015) (“King may
signal that the Court is positioning itself as a check against agency efforts to transform statutory
schemes in contexts where partisan legislative dysfunction prevents congressional response.”).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(G)(i)(I).
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meaning of these terms was the main source of Treasury and SBA
discretion.
Dictionary definitions help illustrate the ambiguity of the hardship
certification. Consider for instance the word “necessary.” One
definition is, “absolutely needed,” while another is, “logically
unavoidable.” 205 A firm might argue that layoffs were “logically
unavoidable” without PPP funding because the firm would in fact
choose layoffs absent PPP funding. The government might respond
that “necessary” for purposes of the hardship certification does not
mean “logically unavoidable,” but rather means “absolutely needed.”
Under the “absolutely needed” definition, a PPP loan would not be
necessary if the firm had access to other funds elsewhere—even if the
specifics of the no credit elsewhere prerequisite usually applicable to
SBA loans did not apply. 206
One structural reason why the hardship certification gave
discretion to Treasury and the SBA stems from enforcement. Consider
the contrary, no-enforcement-discretion argument. This interpretation
is premised on the claim that the PPP statute mandated Treasury and
the SBA to make grants to anyone who submitted a hardship
certification.
This no-enforcement-discretion argument fails because Treasury
and the SBA bear the responsibility of rejecting incorrect hardship
certifications. The statute gives administrators this responsibility.
Under the PPP statute, loan forgiveness is contingent on providing
“true and correct” documentation, and the SBA is directed to issue
implementing “guidance and regulations.” 207 The statute further states
that the usual SBA “terms, conditions and processes” generally apply. 208
These make clear that the agencies may terminate loan guarantees for
noncompliance with the program. 209 Regulations specific to the PPP
statute also state that the “SBA may review any PPP loan” and outline
the procedure for such a review. 210 All of these elements show that
Treasury and the SBA have enforcement discretion.
205. Necessary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/necessary
[https://perma.cc/3W6M-QEHJ].
206. See supra note 32 (describing the no-credit-elsewhere provision).
207. 15 U.S.C. § 636m(e) (requiring “true and correct” documentation); § 636m(f) (prohibiting
forgiveness without documentation); § 636m(k) (providing for SBA “guidance and regulations
implementing this section” within 30 days of enactment).
208. § 636(a)(36)(B).
209. See, e.g., 13 C.F.R. § 120.524 (“SBA is released from liability on a loan guarantee (in whole
or in part, within SBA’s exclusive discretion), if . . . : [t]he Lender has failed to comply materially
with any Loan Program Requirement . . . .”).
210. See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—Loan
Forgiveness Requirements and Loan Review Procedures as Amended by Economic Aid Act, 86 Fed.
Reg. 8283, 8294–95 (Feb. 5, 2011) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120) (describing procedures for
review and remedies for ineligibility).
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The limits of Treasury and the SBA’s discretion are illustrated by
the agencies’ initial decision to bring traditional SBA eligibility
restrictions over to PPP regulation. 211 Although these regulations were
exercises of rulemaking or guidance discretion rather than
enforcement discretion, they illustrate the outside limits of the
agencies’ capacity to interpret the statute. Ineligible applicants under
these regulations included firms “engaged in any illegal activity,”
businesses “of a prurient sexual nature,” firms disqualified because of
their owners’ criminal histories, firms that have previously defaulted on
a federal loan, gambling businesses, and lobbying firms. 212 The PPP’s
statutory language did not exclude such businesses. But Treasury and
the SBA issued guidance that did. Initially, the SBA prohibited these
businesses from accessing the PPP, simply by importing the rules
usually used for granting ordinary-course SBA loans.
Adversely affected businesses challenged these prohibitions as
applied to the PPP, often on administrative law grounds. In some cases,
plaintiffs persuaded courts that Treasury and the SBA’s interpretation
exceeded the administrators’ authority, because the PPP statute
extended benefits to “any business concern” without similar
limitations. 213 Several courts held that categorical prohibitions were

211. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg.
20,811, 20,812 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120).
212. 13 C.F.R. § 120.110 (listing businesses ineligible for SBA business loans).
213. For adult entertainment businesses, one decision concluded that the PPP’s extension of
benefits to “any business concern” precluded the SBA from denying eligibility to any classification
of businesses. See DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 459 F. Supp. 3d 943,
956 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(granting preliminary injunction after finding no ambiguity under Chevron step 1)); see also
Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc. v. U.S Small Bus. Admin., 458 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1056–57 (E.D. Wis.
2020) (“[The provision] exceeds the scope of the regulatory authority Congress granted the SBA”).
But another decision concluded that “any” should instead be construed within the context of the
SBA’s established practice of allocating resources to certain businesses. See Pharaohs GC, Inc. v.
U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 2020 WL 3489404, at *4–6, No. 20-CV-665 (W.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020)
(denying preliminary injunction), aff’d 990 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2021).
For bankrupt firms, at least two courts have held that the statute allows an interpretation
that denies eligibility. Diocese of Rochester v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 466 F. Supp. 3d 363, 378
(W.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837) (explaining that it considered whether the SBA’s
regulation was arbitrary and capricious under step two of the analysis determining deference to
regulations); Tradeways, Ltd. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. ELH-20-1324, 2020 WL 3447767, at *15
(D. Md. June 24, 2020) (concluding that the statute allowed the exclusion of bankrupt firms). At
least one court has concluded that such an interpretation is arbitrary and capricious. Alaska
Urological Inst., P.C. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 619 B.R. 689, 707–08 (D. Alaska 2020) (holding on
summary judgment that bankruptcy exclusion was arbitrary and capricious).
For restrictions based on owner criminal histories, one decision based on a State Farm
analysis concluded that earlier rules that limited eligibility with no explanation were invalid, but
that later, less restrictive rules that included an explanation were valid. Defy Ventures, Inc. v. U.S.
Small Bus. Admin., 469 F. Supp. 3d 459, 475–76 (D. Md. 2020) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of
U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983)) (applying “reasoned explanation”
doctrine).
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arbitrary and capricious214 interpretations of the PPP statute and thus
invalid. 215 But the results were mixed; other courts interpreted the
agencies’ discretion more broadly and denied plaintiffs’ requests for
injunctive relief. 216
Yet although Treasury and the SBA might be barred from
categorically denying PPP funding to certain kinds of businesses, the
agencies were at the same time expected to block PPP funding in the
case of false applications. In between these two extremes lies
considerable discretion, supported largely by the hardship certification.
One way in which Treasury and the SBA exercised this discretion was
their decision to discourage application by public firms and for loans
over $2 million. This reflected an interpretation that loans of larger
amounts or for public firms were less necessary or, in other words,
more likely to involve an incorrect hardship certification.
Treasury and the SBA had latitude to design their guidance to
provide their decisions with maximum protection against the risk of
challenge under administrative law. Imagine that Treasury and the SBA
wanted to discourage applications from residential real estate brokers,
on the grounds that this sector was thriving in the pandemic economy.
The agency might consider two possible design strategies. One strategy
is an outright prohibition on applications from residential real estate
brokers. The other strategy is a statement that Treasury and the SBA
will audit the hardship exemptions of residential real estate brokers.
The first strategy, an outright prohibition, would be more
vulnerable to administrative challenge. The broker—like the adult
entertainment businesses and firms in bankruptcy that objected to
rules prohibiting their applications—could claim that the outright
prohibition was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of agency
discretion. Perhaps the agencies could provide a good explanation of
their exclusion of real estate brokers from the program, and its
guidance might survive arbitrary and capricious review. The point,
though, is that it is straightforward to bring the challenge in the first
place.

In the gambling sector, a challenge to the exclusion of Native American tribes’ casinos from
the benefits of the PPP relied on an administrative law and statutory interpretation argument.
Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v.
Carranza, No. 20-cv-04070 (D. S.D. Apr. 23, 2020). Soon after the complaint was filed, SBA
guidance was changed to allow such businesses to apply. See Business Loan Temporary Changes;
Paycheck Protection Program—Requirements—Promissory Notes, Authorizations, Affiliation and
Eligibility, 85 Fed. Reg. 23,450, 23,451 (Apr. 28, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 120–21).
214. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57 (holding that the revision of a
regulation was invalid because of the absence of sufficient reasoned explanation).
215. See, e.g., DV Diamond Club of Flint, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 956; Alaska Urological Inst., 619 B.R. at
707–08.
216. See, e.g., Pharoahs GC, 2020 WL 3489404, at *4-6; Tradeways, 2020 WL 3447767, at *15.
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The second strategy, an enforcement-discretion statement that
Treasury and the SBA would audit real estate broker hardship
exemptions, would be harder for a real estate broker to challenge.
Agency actions falling under the heading of enforcement discretion
receive additional deference. 217 Standing is also more difficult for a
plaintiff to establish. 218 If the audit policy discouraged a real estate
broker from applying for the PPP, there would be no adverse
application result to litigate. If the broker applied for the PPP and was
denied, the terms of the litigation would likely focus on the facts of the
particular case rather than consider the overall validity of the
enforcement policy.
This real estate broker example shows the advantage for the agency
of using an enforcement policy rather than an outright prohibition to
prioritize the distribution of PPP emergency funds. When Treasury and
the SBA decided to prioritize loans of $2 million or less to privately held
companies, the agencies did not expressly prohibit larger or public
grants. Instead, they used enforcement “safe harbors” and “sure
shipwreck” threats of enforcement to discourage larger grants and
grants to publicly traded firms. These provisions were not explicit
prohibitions, but they advanced the intended goal nevertheless. As the
data show, they produced sharp drop-offs in PPP applications from
larger and public firms. 219 These safe harbors and sure shipwrecks
grounded in enforcement discretion further illustrate the agencies’
capacity to exercise their enforcement discretion to express an
interpretation of the hardship certification.

217. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985) (stating presumption of unreviewability for
“agency decisions not to institute proceedings”). The Chaney decision noted that the case did not
involve an express agency policy “that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its
responsibilities.” Id. at 833 n.4. Courts generally apply Chaney to deny review of nonenforcement
decisions. See KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19:7
(6th ed. 2020). But see Casa De Md. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 924 F.3d 684, 698–701 (4th Cir.
2019) (reviewing decision to rescind DACA) (“[A]n agency’s expression of a broad or general
enforcement policy based on the agency’s legal interpretation is subject to review.”), cert. denied sub
nom., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Casa de Md., 141 S. Ct. 156 (2020).
218. See, e.g., Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(refusing standing on grounds that Title IX proportionality safe harbor did not require colleges to
change the gender balance of their athletes, for instance by cutting men’s teams); Renal Physicians
Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 489 F.3d 1267, 1276–77 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (denying
standing because of missing causal connection between regulatory safe harbor under Stark Act
and dialysis center compensation reduction). But see U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578
U.S. 590, 599–601 (2016) (concluding that the EPA took a final, reviewable action when it refused to
grant a negative jurisdictional determination that would have resulted in a five-year safe harbor
from civil enforcement proceedings).
219. See supra Section II.C (explaining data showing effect of safe harbor).
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C. Interpretive Range for the Hardship Certification
In exercising their enforcement discretion, Treasury and the SBA
might have considered various meanings of the text of the hardship
certification “that the uncertainty of current economic conditions
makes necessary the loan request to support the ongoing operations of
the eligible recipient.”220 Language such as “uncertainty of current
economic conditions,” “necessary . . . to support,” and “ongoing
operations” might support different interpretations. 221 These different
meanings in turn suggest different views of what an optimal allocation
of PPP funds would have been. “Necessary” might mean most likely to
help specific economic sectors, most likely to be the deciding factor in a
firm’s survival, most likely to preserve jobs, or smallest application size.
The first view is sector-specific. It might emphasize “the
uncertainty of current economic conditions” as a prerequisite. This
could suggest that particularly hard-hit sectors, such as the restaurant
and performance businesses, should have priority. 222
A second view is that necessary should have been interpreted to
mean, in effect, “necessary and sufficient.” This idea is that targeted
firms had an intermediate character. The ideal PPP recipient was
strong enough to survive with PPP funds, but weak enough that the
firm would fail without PPP help. 223 This could suggest that firms that
demonstrated greater revenue loss at the moment of the pandemic
should be more eligible to receive funds.
220. 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(G)(i)(I).
221. Dictionary definitions do not help much in resolving ambiguity in the hardship
certification. Consider the dictionary definition of the word “necessary.” One option is, “absolutely
needed.” Another is, “logically unavoidable.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 205. A firm might find
layoffs “logically unavoidable” without PPP funding (i.e., because the firm would in fact choose
layoffs absent PPP funding) without concluding that PPP funding was “absolutely needed” to avoid
them (i.e., because it would be possible, if the firm so chose, to raise funds elsewhere).
222. See, e.g., Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Nathaniel Hendren, Michael Stepner & The
Opportunity Insights Team, How Did COVID-19 and Stabilization Policies Affect Spending and
Employment? A New Real-Time Economic Tracker Based on Private Sector Data 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 27431, 2020), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers
/w27431/w27431.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYF8-GU6D] (noting heavier impact of pandemic on inperson sectors in affluent neighborhoods); see also Catherine Buffington, Carrie Dennis, Emin
Dinlersoz, Lucia Foster & Shawn Klimek, Measuring the Effect of COVID-19 on U.S. Small Businesses:
The Small Business Pulse Survey 17 (U.S. Census Bureau, Ctr. for Econ. Stud., Working Paper No.
CES-20-16, 2020), https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2020/CES-WP-20-16.pdf [https://perma.cc
/3CML-AC3F] (“Turning to requests for financial assistance, it is perhaps not surprising to see
highest percent of requests for PPP (84.5%) from businesses in Accommodation and Food Services.
Overall, 74.9% of businesses applied for PPP. In terms of receiving assistance, 38.1% received
assistance from the PPP program.”).
223. Cf. Gustavo Joaquim & Felipe Netto, Bank Incentives and the Impact of the Paycheck
Protection Program 3 (Oct. 2, 2020) (unpublished paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3704518
(presenting a model developed to identify the optimal allocation of PPP funds, assuming that the
goal is to save the most jobs and showing that, if the emergency fund is limited, funds should go to
those “intermediately affected by the pandemic”).
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A third view focuses on job preservation. It might emphasize the
language “to support the ongoing operations of the eligible recipient.”
If interpreted with the purpose of preserving jobs in mind, the words
“ongoing operations” might be understood to mean that PPP funds
should be directed to support a firm’s “continued employment at prepandemic levels.” 224
A fourth view relates to loan size. This idea is that smaller loans
were more necessary because they helped smaller businesses. The
statute did not link greater necessity to smaller business size
explicitly, 225 but it could follow from the empirical observation that
smaller businesses are less likely to have cash on hand and access to
private financing. 226 Larger businesses may have more diverse collateral
to offer to secure loans, and banks earn larger fees on larger loans
without a proportionately greater increase in banker time and other
resources. In 2020, smaller businesses also had less access to other
forms of emergency government financing, such as Federal Reserve
programs that anticipated buying issued corporate bonds. 227
D. First-Come, First-Served
Treasury and the SBA’s initial response to the PPP statute was, as
their posted guidance stated, “first-come, first-served.” 228 As explained
supra, the statute did not require this approach—Treasury’s
enforcement discretion, which allowed it to reject incorrect hardship
applications, gave it the ability to prioritize applications based on some
concept of necessity or hardship, rather than adopting a first-come,
first-served policy. It was an administrative choice to leave the
allocation of funds to private actors. Why did Treasury make that
choice?

224. There is mixed evidence on the question of whether the PPP saved jobs. See, e.g., Bartik et
al., supra note 5, at 23–24 (finding an average effect of increased jobs for PPP recipients); Chetty et
al., supra note 222, at 4–5 (arguing that PPP loans had “modest marginal impacts on employment”
because funds “went to inframarginal firms”). Meanwhile, there is some evidence that one key PPP
result was replacement of funds rather than provision of funds that could not be found elsewhere.
Chodorow-Reich et al., supra note 91, at 2 (finding that PPP loans reduced non-PPP borrowing by
between 53% and 125%).
225. The statutory text, which features a 500-employee limit, diverges from both intuitive
understandings of “small business” and previous legal definitions such as the SBA’s table of size
standards based on revenue, number of employees, and industry code. See supra notes 28–30
(discussing employee size limit).
226. See Parilla et al., supra note 93 (“[W]e know that the smallest firms are the least liquid.”).
227. See Menand, supra note 36, at 315–21 (describing ad hoc credit facilities).
228. See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed.
Reg. 20,811, 20,813 (Apr. 15, 2020) (“Is the PPP ‘first-come, first-served?’ Yes.”).
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One reason is that a first-come, first-served approach was fast—it
would get cash out quickly, no matter to whom. The CARES Act came at
a moment of abruptly soaring unemployment, stock market volatility,
and other indications of economic instability. 229 It was one of a number
of measures with a policy goal of liquidity. When pushing cash into the
economy is the overriding goal, larger loans have an advantage.230
A second reason is that a first-come, first-served approach follows
an established and familiar allocation approach. First-come, firstserved is similar to allocating resources via queue. Queueing seems
egalitarian in that its place-in-line criterion does not explicitly follow
from characteristics like wealth or connections. Rather, queueing gives
resources to those who arrive first, in a manner similar to the classic
property rules of occupancy and capture.231
First-come, first-served may suggest an inherently fair result,
because the agency does not directly pick winners and losers. Instead,
benefits are allocated according to a line of applications established by
forces located outside the agency. 232 The idea is that any applicant who
could make a colorable hardship certification met a criterion of
“absolute worthiness,” 233 and by staying out of the exercise of favoring
one candidate over another, the agency remained neutral and fair.
The problem, of course, is that in the case of the PPP, the ordering
of the line was not random. As the empirical evidence shows, the bestresourced applicants got the best places in line. Connections, after all,

229. See, e.g., Ben Casselman, Sapna Maheshwari & David Yaffe-Bellany, Layoffs Are Just
Starting, and the Forecasts Are Bleak, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03
/18/business/stock-market-today.html [https://perma.cc/T8PQ-NMH9] (noting early signs of
rapidly increasing unemployment); Neal Boudette, Jack Ewing, Ana Swanson, David McCabe,
Cecilia Kang, Alan Rappeport, Ben Casselman, Davey Alba, Clifford Krauss, Sapna Maheshwari,
Nicholas Fandos, Jim Tankersley, Amie Tsang, Kate Conger, Adam Satariano, Matthew Goldstein,
Mike Isaac, Jason Gutierrez, Edmund Lee, Carlos Tejada, Kevin Granville, Daniel Victor & Nelson
Schwartz, Fed Announces More Loans as Investor Alarm Persists, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/business/stock-market-today.html [https://perma.cc/T8PQNMH9] (reviewing steps taken to prevent financial crisis as market indicators fell).
230. See, e.g., Derek Thompson, Shake Shack Is Not the Problem, ATLANTIC (Apr. 23, 2020), https://
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/shake-shack-not-problem/610417/ [https://perma.cc
/8D3F-JNY5]; cf. Glenn Hubbard & Michael R. Strain, Has the Paycheck Protection Program Succeeded? 10
(IZA Inst. of Lab. Econ., Discussion Paper No. 13808, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3718188.
Hubbard & Strain argue that the PPP’s goal is to preserve small business continuity, rather than
simply preserving jobs, and also that in the “fog-of-war atmosphere of the pandemic,” the
government lacks enough information to sensibly pick “winners and losers”. Hubbard & Strain, supra.
231. Young, supra note 12, at 75; see also Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, Queues in Law, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 1595, 1603–07, 1621 (2014) (noting that queues are generally thought of as fair and questioning
their efficiency).
232. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 188, at 43 (analyzing the “first-come, first-served
method”).
233. See id. at 63.
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did matter. 234 The data is especially stark when it comes to racial
disparities in the first wave of the program. 235
If, as initially expected, the PPP fund had been limited to the firstwave allocation of $349 billion (the amount initially authorized in the
CARES Act), 236 the story might have ended with these biased data
points. Instead, Congress increased the allocation, resulting in almost
$800 billion in grants. 237 As it turned out, the PPP was not a finite
emergency fund, and its first-order constraint dissipated. Still, its
administrative experiments provide lessons that could be used by other
emergency funds, including those with a true first-order limit.
E. A Learning Curve
When more money was appropriated for PPP loans, the program’s
second wave did not keep the doors open to every applicant who
arguably qualified under the statute. Instead, the government iterated
its approach to the PPP through three waves of the program. The first
wave involved little regulation. 238 The second wave featured regulations
that sorted applications, at least roughly, by size, as some applicants—
such as public firms and those who asked for more than $2 million—
were disfavored in the second wave of the program. 239 The third wave
continued the size regulations of the second wave and added revenueloss requirements, and priorities for certain business sectors as well as
for applicants with fewer than twenty employees. 240 The PPP story
shows that learning or information gathering in one stage can
influence the distribution choices made at later stages.
This demonstrates that at least some emergency fund projects can
include an administrative learning curve. Information gathered early in
the program can be used to make changes later in the program. The
administrator can anticipate making changes later in the program,
perhaps to correct initial fund distribution mistakes. Another design
approach is to gather information early in the program and to use this
information to update program distribution rules going forward.
The PPP imparts two interesting regulatory design lessons for
emergency fund administration. Both are aimed at gathering
information and making adjustments. In other words, both anticipate a
234. See supra Section II.A (explaining importance of connections in first wave of PPP).
235. See supra Section II.F (explaining racial disparity data).
236. See sources cited, supra note 16 (detailing initial enactment of CARES Act).
237. See PPP REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH MAY 2021, supra note 2 (reporting total grants under
the PPP).
238. See supra Section II.A (explaining the first wave of the PPP).
239. See supra Section II.C (explaining the second wave of the PPP).
240. See supra Section II.D (explaining the third wave of the PPP).
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learning curve. One design possibility involves back-end guidance. This
is discussed in Part IV. The other design possibility involves first
prioritizing bids that more clearly meet the program’s requirements,
and later moving on to lower priority applications that do not as clearly
advance the program’s goals. This idea—distributing in descending
order of necessity—is discussed in Part V.
IV. BACK-END GUIDANCE
A. The PPP’s Back-End Adjustments
Back-end adjustments provide one method for managing the
emergency-fund tradeoff between accuracy and speed. A back-end
adjustment is a later modification to the original terms of a program.241
Typical examples include deadline extensions, exceptions, and
variances. 242 In an emergency fund program like the PPP, a back-end
adjustment means that first funds are distributed, and later it is
decided whether a recipient must return funds.
The forgivable-loan structure of the PPP offered at least two points
at which decisions could be made about the structure of the loan. The
first point related to the terms of borrowing and the later point related
to the terms of forgiveness. Both were amended in back-end
adjustment fashion.
The terms of borrowing were changed most prominently by the
PPP guidance that discouraged applications of more than $2 million or
by publicly traded companies. 243 In particular, the audit threat
announced in April 2020 for public companies was a back-end
adjustment with a retroactive effect. 244 It caused 110 public firms to
return about $600 million. 245 This was a change that tightened PPP
guidance and made terms stricter after the start of the program.
A more typical back-end adjustment loosens requirements, making
terms more lenient after the start of the program. Variances and
deadline extensions fall into this category; that is, they relax
requirements. 246 The idea is that a law may choose, for example, strict

241. Glicksman & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 1179.
242. See id. at 1187.
243. See PPP: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 86; supra text accompanying note 130
(setting forth April 2020 guidance regarding public companies).
244. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text (explaining “sure shipwreck” effect of April
2020 guidance).
245. See Cororaton & Rosen, supra note 107, at 10, 11 tbl.1 (finding that 13.5% of public company
borrowers returned funds and that the total loan amount to public firms was $2.2 billion gross and
$1.6 billion net of returns).
246. See Glicksman & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 1187.
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time limits and other requirements, but also include a process through
which the agency can adjust these on a case-by-case basis.
The PPP also featured back-end adjustments that relaxed its terms.
For example, the Flexibility Act enacted in June 2020 increased the
timeframe for using loan proceeds from eight weeks to twenty-four
weeks. 247 This Act allowed employers to disregard reductions in
employment if the reductions were due to compliance with public
health regulations. 248 It also decreased the proportion of funds that had
to be spent on payroll from seventy-five percent to sixty percent. 249
Later, the December 2020 statute added allowed expenses, such as
worker protection expenses, and provided a simpler process for
forgiving loans of $150,000 or less. 250 Each of these adjustments
loosened the forgiveness terms of the PPP.
There is a theory that explains several desirable components of
back-end regulatory adjustments. First, back-end adjustments are
appropriate when front-end regulation is likely to produce imperfect
policy because of uncertainty or lack of information. 251 Second, an
initially stricter policy best supports later back-end adjustments. 252 In
other words, relaxing a policy is easier than increasing its strictness.
Third, a transparent process should be used to provide back-end
adjustments, to guard against the risk of capture. 253
One lesson from the PPP is that if an emergency fund program
starts with initially stricter terms, it can anticipate back-end
adjustments that might relax those terms. But another, contrasting
lesson is that it is also possible to tighten, rather than loosen, terms
over the course of a program. Recipients are more likely to object to
changes that make a policy stricter, but some such changes can be made
in a way that respects the rule of law and the rights of recipients.

247. Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-142, § 3, 134 Stat. 641
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(A)(iii)) (extending covered period to end as late as
December 31, 2020); Revisions to Loan Forgiveness and Loan Review Procedures Interim Final
Rules, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,304, 38,306 (June 26, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120).
248. Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses, Nonprofits, and Venues Act, Pub. L. No. 116260, § 304, 134 Stat. 1993 (2020) (listing additional allowed covered expenses).
249. Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act § 3 (requiring usage of sixty percent of loan
amount for payroll costs).
250. Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses, Nonprofits and Venues Act § 307 (providing
for one-page form that requires information about number of retained employees, estimated
amount of loan spent on payroll, and total loan value).
251. See Glicksman & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 1183–84 (citing limitations on ex ante costbenefit analysis). See generally SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 72–120 (2003) (criticizing the false precision and incomplete
welfare analysis of front-end regulatory requirements such as cost-benefit analysis).
252. See Glicksman & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 1187 (noting “deadline extensions and waivers,
variances, and exceptions” as examples of back-end adjustments).
253. See id. at 1247 (recommending transparent adjustment procedures to allow public
monitoring of agency decisions).
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Congress could anticipate back-end adjustments in an emergency
fund statute. For instance, Congress could have authorized a loan
program that was funded with a net figure. Instead of allocating $349
billion in grants to the program, the statute’s first round might have
authorized a larger loan facility, but provided that no more than $349
billion in loans could be forgiven or go uncollected. This statutory
authorization would have anticipated a payment schedule contingent
on future events.
If a payment schedule were contingent on future events, perhaps
concerns would arise that back-end guidance that made borrowing
terms stricter might disadvantage or surprise borrowers. Explicit
congressional authorization for certain kinds of back-end adjustments
might reduce these concerns. But in the case of the PPP, Congress did
not explicitly anticipate or place limits on back-end adjustments.
Instead, Treasury and the SBA used enforcement discretion to tighten
the program’s terms. Nevertheless, the PPP’s back-end adjustments
were arguably within the limits of the statute.
B. The Normalcy of Back-End Adjustments
The idea of back-end adjustments for emergency funds may appear
like the government is inappropriately changing the deal or moving the
goalposts. It may sound like an unusual and extraordinary move. But,
to the contrary, back-end adjustments have precedent in many areas of
law.
Consider the example of a private debt contract, which the parties
can agree to amend. When a lender and a borrower enter into a debt
contract, the contract may have various terms allowing the lender to
force the borrower to repay. For instance, the lender may charge late
fees if the borrower fails to pay on time. Or the breach of a covenant
might allow the lender to foreclose on collateral pledged by the
borrower. Although these terms are agreed to in advance, they can also
later be changed unilaterally, so long as the party changing the terms
does so against its own interest. A lender can unilaterally waive late
fees. A lender can also choose to ignore the breach of a covenant rather
than pursuing collateral.
Consider also the example of a security written such that the
government’s support will vary, under the terms of the security,
depending on future events. The government’s support could increase
if future events involved poor economic performance and decrease if
future events involved good economic performance. This variation in
the level of government support follows the outlines of the economic
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terms of owning equity in an entity, since an equity holder has a
residual claim on firm profits.
The approach of equity investment was specifically used in the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). There, the government bought
equity in troubled companies. 254 The equity purchased by the
government through TARP could have amounted to an outright
transfer to the troubled companies if the firms had gone bankrupt,
since the government’s holdings, as equity, were junior to the claims of
firm creditors. 255 Instead, when troubled companies recovered, the
companies repurchased the equity held by the government. 256 In the
end, the government’s support was mostly temporary.
Another example of back-end adjustment involves tax law. The
income tax system provides a built-in opportunity to tighten the effect
of a government spending program in the future. That is, the
government can later decide to “tax it back,” or modify the effect of the
grant through the income tax.
The government’s ability to “tax it back” preserves flexibility to
modify the effect of a government program that transfers cash to
taxpayers. Some cash transfers—such as individual stimulus payments
made in 2020—are not taxed. 257 But other cash government transfers
are taxed.
Social Security payments, for instance, have been subject to various
income tax inclusion rules. 258 Until 1983, Social Security payments were
untaxed. 259 Later, the rules changed and became stricter. For instance,
in 1983, a new Code provision taxed some Social Security benefits.260

254. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 194, at 528 (describing government capital injections in
exchange for preferred stock and warrants to repurchase common stock).
255. See id. (describing government holdings of preferred stock as “pari passu to existing
preferred shares in the capital structure of the banks”).
256. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 2–3 (2021)
(reporting that Treasury transferred $205 billion to financial institutions in the form of preferred
stock purchases, that only $12 million remained outstanding, and that “almost all” of $2.2 billion of
government loans used to fund repurchases had also been repaid).
257. For example, the 2020 stimulus program did not tax back stimulus payments in the future.
See I.R.C. § 6428(f) (providing that individuals would be treated as having made a tax payment in an
amount equal to the amount of the advance refund); see also Carlton Smith, So, How Will the “Recovery
Rebate” Refunds Work This Time Part I, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Mar. 27, 2020), https://
procedurallytaxing.com/so-how-will-the-recovery-rebate-refunds-work-this-time-part-i/ [https://
perma.cc/2XX3-5MET]; cf. Sarmiento v. United States, 678 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that status of
2008 payment as an “advance refund” meant that IRS would retain refund for particular taxpayers
because of the terms of earlier Offer-in-Compromise settlements).
258. See Jonathan B. Forman, The Income Tax Treatment of Social Welfare Benefits, 26 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 785, 785, 790–91, 795–96 (1993) (explaining historic evolution of rules for taxation of Social
Security benefits).
259. Id. at 795 (outlining pre-1983 exemption of Social Security benefits from income tax).
260. See id. (explaining 1983 adoption of “[p]artial taxation of Social Security benfits [sic]”); see
also I.R.C. § 86 (providing for inclusion of some Social Security benefits in income).
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A person who retired in 1982 might have expected to receive Social
Security benefits free of tax. But for many retirees, this is not what
happened. Instead, the tax law changed, and they were required to
return some of their Social Security benefits to the government, simply
because the amount of income tax that they owed the federal
government increased as payment of income taxes as a result of this
change.
Another example is unemployment income. This was relevant
under 2020 federal emergency legislation, which expanded
unemployment benefits. 261 Typically, unemployment benefits are
included in gross income for tax purposes. 262 Consider a grocery store
worker who continued to work and receive wage income, compared to a
restaurant worker who had been laid off and received unemployment
benefits. Under the usual rule, the grocery worker must include their
wage income and the restaurant worker must include their
unemployment benefits in income.
The CARES Act, which substantially increased unemployment
benefits, was silent on the question of whether those benefits would be
excluded from income. 263 That suggested that the usual rule—that the
benefits would be included in gross income—would continue to apply.
For unemployment benefits, Congress started with the stricter rule.
Congress said that unemployment benefits were included in income for
tax purposes—this action preserved a classic back-end adjustment
opportunity to relax the rule. If Congress, after observing the effect of
the unemployment policy and other policies, concluded that some or all
of the unemployment income should be excluded despite the usual rule
of taxation, it could pass a law excluding the income. Indeed, that is
exactly what happened.
In 2021, Congress made a back-end adjustment to the gross income
inclusion rules for 2020 unemployment benefits. 264 It excluded
unemployment benefits of $10,200 for a worker making up to
$150,000. 265 This represents a temporal solution to the problem that
Congress faced in March 2020. At the outset, Congress could choose to
261.
262.
263.

See sources cited supra note 35 (describing unemployment benefits under the CARES Act).
I.R.C. § 85 (“[G]ross income includes unemployment compensation.”).
See Brian Galle & Elizabeth Pancotti, The Case for Forgiving Taxes on Pandemic Unemployment Aid,
C ENTURY F OUND . (Feb. 8, 2021), https://tcf.org/content/report/the-case-for-forgiving-taxes-onpandemic-unemployment-aid/?agreed=1 [https://perma.cc/2KUG-MJVJ] (noting that unemployment
benefits are usually subject to tax and also noting that withholding obligations were often not met with
respect to unemployment benefits supported by the CARES Act).
264. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9042, 135 Stat. 4 (to be codified at
I.R.C. § 85(c)); see also Galle & Pancotti, supra note 263 (arguing that existing law supported the
exemption of pandemic-related unemployment benefits from income tax, including because a
typically applicable ten percent withholding rule was not universally applied).
265. See I.R.C. § 85(c) (exempting, for 2020, unemployment benefits up to $10,200 if taxpayer’s
adjusted gross income is less than $250,000).
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increase unemployment benefits without deciding what the tax
treatment should be. It could wait to decide about that tax treatment.
Later, Congress could, and did, decide to exclude some unemployment
benefits from income.
C. Limits on Back-End Adjustments
If an administrative agency implements back-end adjustments that
make it more difficult for recipients to keep emergency funds, some
might object that the adjustments improperly depart from the terms of
the statute that authorized funding. Recall the premise that when
Congress makes an emergency fund statute, the law typically will
feature incomplete instructions and leave enforcement discretion in
the hands of an administrative agency. 266 This may mean that an
emergency fund statute will not provide explicitly for any back-end
adjustment, consistent with the premise that emergency fund statutes
in general tend to be underspecified. This is the situation presented by
the case study of the PPP. It was silent on the question of back-end
adjustments. Nevertheless, the implementation of the PPP revealed a
pathway for an administrative agency to create back-end adjustments
using the tool of enforcement discretion.
In contrast to the silence of the PPP statute, some back-end
adjustments occur pursuant to legislation or pursuant to an ex ante
contract. For example, a zoning ordinance may establish a procedure
for obtaining an exception, or variance. 267 Or, a security purchased by
the government may by its terms require that the recipient return the
funds if certain conditions were met. This was the effect of the equity
purchased by the government under TARP.268 Because the TARP-aided
firms did well, they bought back the government’s equity. If the TARPaided firms had performed poorly, the government purchase of equity
might have become a permanent investment or grant.
In contrast, the PPP’s back-end adjustments were not anticipated
by any statute or ex ante contract. Instead they rested simply on the
agencies’ enforcement authority. For example, the sure shipwreck
threat of audit for public firm applicants, which prompted a number of
public firms to return money, rested on the agencies’ enforcement
discretion. This enforcement discretion was built into the statute, but it
was not emphasized in the explanation of the statute. Enforcement

266. See supra Section III.A (explaining the likelihood of “incomplete instructions” for
emergency fund statutes).
267. See Glicksman & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 1187 (studying “deadline extensions and waivers,
variances, and exceptions” as examples of back-end adjustments).
268. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (explaining how purchasing an equity security
had an effect similar to that of a back-end adjustment in the TARP program).
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discretion as a basis of authority for a back-end adjustment is less
explicit than, say, a provision in a zoning regulation that specifies a
procedure for requesting a variance.
In the PPP case, the agencies’ statements that they might audit
public firms and that they would not audit applications for less than $2
million 269 had a rational connection to the hardship exception. But not
all exercises of enforcement discretion would be appropriate back-end
adjustments. There are limits. For instance, limitation time periods,
process requirements, and the content of the statute constrain
agencies’ authority to enforce the law in question.
V. DESCENDING-ORDER-OF-NECESSITY DISTRIBUTION
A. Distribute First to Those Most Eligible
Distribution in descending order of necessity is another way to
manage the tradeoff between speed and accuracy. In the PPP context,
this would mean distributing funds first to applicants who definitely
meet the “necessary” definition and other program requirements, and
then later to applicants whose eligibility is less clear. Under this
approach, the administrator makes easier decisions about eligibility
first and saves the harder decisions for later.
The problem, though, is that emergency funds are often
underspecified; the legislature does not always spell out the eligibility
requirements. The PPP illustrates this problem. Four different plausible
metrics for the definition of “necessary” for purposes of the PPP were
suggested above. 270 As that discussion explained, “most necessary”
could mean most likely to help specific economic sectors, most likely to
be the deciding factor in a firm’s survival, most likely to preserve jobs,
or smallest application size.
Measures actually taken by Treasury and the SBA show that they
partly implemented the idea that larger applications were less
necessary. Starting in the second wave, loans of more than $2 million
were discouraged. 271 Under a December 2020 statutory change, loans of
$150,000 or less benefited from a simplified forgiveness process. 272
Under a third-wave administrative practice in place during February

269. See supra Section II.C (explaining guidance for loans to public companies and loans of
more than $2 million in the second wave of the PPP).
270. See supra Section III.C (explaining interpretive range for hardship exception).
271. See supra Section II.C (explaining safe harbors in second wave of PPP).
272. See supra Section I.A (explaining December 2020 law).
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and March 2021, application priority was given to firms with fewer than
20 employees. 273
B. An Auction Model and a “Clearing” Grant Size
The goal of disbursing emergency money while giving priority to
smaller grants is similar to the problem faced by a person who wishes to
sell a stock of something at the highest price the market will bear. In the
case of the seller of a fixed stock of goods, the problem is that the seller
wishes to sell at the highest price possible but lacks information about
the price that buyers will pay. Information about the prices that
different buyers are willing to pay is needed to arrive at the “clearing”
price at which all of the goods will sell.
In the case of the emergency fund, administrators lack information
about the amount of funds that applicants will request. If the
emergency fund administrator had this information, it could deduce
the “clearing” grant level at which all of the funds would be disbursed,
assuming, in this illustration, that smaller loans or grants should have
priority.
For example, if a $350 billion emergency fund is authorized, and
there are 500,000 requests of $250,000 each (totaling $125 billion),
250,000 requests of $500,000 (totaling $125 billion), and 100,000
requests of $1 million (totaling $100 billion), then these subtotals added
together equal the full $350 billion allocation. Under these assumptions,
the clearing grant amount is $1 million. The administrator can grant
the entire fund in allotments of $1 million or less and should not make
any grants in excess of $1 million. $1 million is the grant amount at
which the emergency fund clears. The information that $1 million is the
clearing grant amount shows an administrator how to disburse funds
in descending order of necessity, or equivalently ascending size of
grant, again assuming that smaller loan requests are more necessary, or
in other words more clearly support program eligibility.
This idea of a clearing grant amount has an analogue in auction
theory. In the case of a person selling goods, a mechanism to determine
the clearing price is a descending-price auction. Under this variation,
the seller starts with a high asking price. Then the seller reduces the
price until enough bids have been submitted to successfully sell all the
goods. 274
An emergency fund administrator could solve its analogous
information problem with an approach inspired by a descending-price
273. See supra Section II.D (describing third wave guidance under Biden administration).
274. See VIJAY KRISHNA, AUCTION THEORY 192–93 (2d ed. 2010) (describing a multiunit open
descending price auction).
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auction. Instead of starting at a high price and proceeding to a low
price, an emergency fund administrator could start with a low grant
amount and then proceed to a higher grant amount, increasing the
amount in order to distribute all of the allocated funds. This would
reveal a clearing grant amount through the mechanism of distribution
in descending order of necessity.
For the PPP, the SBA and Treasury might have started with loans of
no more than $250,000, based on monthly payroll of no more than
$100,000. 275 Then after testing demand for these and making loans at
that level, they could have increased the maximum loan size and payroll
level in increments. The agencies could have continued this process
until the statutory allotment was fully claimed.
If an emergency fund takes this approach, it has a choice about
whether to consider larger loan applications in the first instance. In the
simplest version of a descending-price auction, it would not consider
larger applications initially. Instead, it would take an all-or-nothing
approach to reviewing grant applications. This means the fund would
either accept or reject any single application in full. Initially, it would
only accept smaller applications. An application for $250,000 or less
would initially be allowed, while applications for larger amounts would
not be accepted initially and would have to wait until a later time, when
they would either be accepted or rejected in full.
This kind of all-or-nothing approach corresponds to a multipleprice or pay-what-you bid auction format. In a multiple-price auction,
each bidder pays the price that bidder stated. 276 If translated to the
emergency fund context, the multiple-price approach would produce
the result that applicants would not be eligible for any grant unless and
until the grant amount allowed by the government had increased to the
level of their request. Only after the threshold amount increased
sufficiently would a larger grant applicant receive a grant.
This all-or-nothing approach would be a good fit for an emergency
fund if there is a high level of confidence that applications should be
prioritized according to loan size. It commits to distributing smaller
requests without collecting information on the specific details of larger
applications. Note, though, that the all-or-nothing approach has an
important disadvantage. If a larger applicant cannot claim any benefits
from applying at an earlier stage, the larger applicant has little reason
to share information about a forthcoming application with the

275. Loan size is based on 2.5 times monthly payroll. See supra Section I.A.
276. For instance, in the 1990s, the U.S. Treasury conducted a study in which it used a singleprice approach to auction 2-year and 5-year notes and a multiple-price approach to auction 3-year
and 10-year notes. One reason for using the single-price approach was to expand access to bidding.
MALVEY & ARCHIBALD, supra note 14 ( “[E]xpected revenue under the uniform-price technique is at
least as great and probably greater than under the multiple-price technique”).
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emergency fund administrator. The discussion in Section V.D below
returns to this problem.
C. An Example: Aid to Shuttered Performance Venues
A portion of the federal statute passed by Congress in December
2020 277 took a descending-order-of-necessity approach to distribution,
though one based on the metric of revenue loss rather than size of grant
request. This approach is found in the section of the statute that
explained how up to $15 billion in aid 278 would be provided in forgivable
loans to shuttered live performance venues and related businesses. The
statute provided that for the first fourteen days of grantmaking, only
businesses with ninety percent or greater revenue loss could apply. 279
For the next fourteen days, only businesses with seventy percent or
greater revenue loss could apply. 280
As long as the administrator is committed to distributing in order
of a metric such as percentage of revenue lost, the lack of information
about requests involving smaller revenue losses does not much matter.
It is similar to the situation with a seller of a fixed stock of goods in a
multiple-price auction. Such a seller does not need information about
the lower bids in order to sell goods to higher bidders. Similarly, an
emergency fund administrator does not need information about firms
with less severe revenue losses in order to distribute funds to firms with
more severe revenue losses first.
The December 2020 shuttered performance venue statute stated a
commitment to distribute up to four-fifths of its appropriation to
businesses that saw at least a seventy percent revenue decline. 281 Under
this approach, the SBA did not need to collect information about
businesses that experienced a less severe revenue decline in order to
accomplish the task of distributing up to eighty percent of the
appropriation. Instead, for the first fourteen days of grantmaking
under that provision, the SBA only needed to collect information about
businesses who experienced at least a ninety percent decline in

277. See supra text accompanying notes 50–59 (describing the Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small
Businesses, Nonprofits, and Venues Act).
278. Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses, Nonprofits, and Venues Act, Pub. L. No. 116260, § 323(d)(1)(H), 134 Stat. 1993 (2020).
279. See id. § 324(b)(2)(B)(i) (providing for grants to businesses with revenue not more than
ten percent of previous period revenue for first fourteen days of grant awards).
280. See id. § 324(b)(2)(B)(ii) (providing for grants to businesses with revenue not more than
thirty percent of previous period revenue for second fourteen days of grant awards).
281. See id. § 324(b)(2)(B)(iv) (limiting funds awarded during first twenty-eight days of grants
to eighty percent of appropriation).
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revenue, and would only distribute to those businesses. 282 Then, for the
next fourteen days of grantmaking, the SBA only needed to consider
businesses who experienced at least a seventy percent decline in
revenue. 283 Other live performance venues or related businesses (i.e.,
those whose revenue loss experience was not as severe) had to wait
until the initial tranches of grantmaking had finished.
D. An Information-Collection Model of
Descending-Order-of-Necessity Distribution
The PPP story suggests that sometimes the emergency fund
administrator will be unwilling to commit at the beginning to a method
for distributing the emergency fund. 284 Instead, the administrator may
anticipate a learning curve that will cause it to change methods of
distribution over the life of the program. In this case, an all-or-nothing
descending-order-of-necessity approach that first only accepts small
applications would not be the best approach. Instead, the approach
should be tailored to the goal of gathering information. 285
If the ascending-grant-size, descending-order-of-necessity distribution
idea is used for information collection, it should not be a commitment
to a method for distributing the whole fund. It should instead be a tool
to buy information at an affordable price. The idea is that if small initial
grants are plausibly most necessary and thus most consistent with the
statutory language and the goals of the program, then small initial
grants are an affordable and appropriate way to buy information about
the applicant pool. In contrast, what actually happened under the PPP
was that the government paid very high prices, in the form of large
forgivable loans, to gather information about the applicant pool. 286

282. See id. § 324(b)(2)(B) (explaining “initial priorities for awarding grants” during the first
twenty-eight days of the program).
283. See id. § 324(b)(2)(C). The statute also provided a special set-aside of $2 billion for
applicants with no more than fifty employees. See id. § 324(b)(2)(E) (providing set-aside for first
sixty days during which grants were awarded).
284. The three waves of the PPP represented an evolving approach to distribution. Data on
distribution results also varied over the course of the program. One example is the decreasing size
of grants. See supra Section II.E (explaining reduction in loan amount over time). Another is the
decrease in the racial disparities among PPP grant recipients. See supra Sections II.A, II.F
(describing and considering mechanisms for racial disparities in PPP).
285. The rationale of extracting information from applicants is analogous to the goal of
structuring auctions to influence bidder behavior in a way that produces a better result for the
seller. See DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS: REASONING ABOUT A
HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD 252–54 (1st ed. 2010) (explaining choice among auction formats as
choice about influencing bidder behavior).
286. See supra Section II.A (explaining results of the PPP’s first wave); supra Section II.B
(describing public and media reactions to results of PPP’s first wave).
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Section V.B supra explains that the idea of using an ascendinggrant-size, descending-necessity approach for distributing an entire
fund could follow a multiple-price, pay-what-you-bid descending-price
auction model, in which each applicant either received the amount
applied for, or nothing at all. To see why this all-or-nothing approach
would not successfully maximize information-gathering, consider a
hypothetical in which the PPP initially considered only applications for
grants of $250,000 or less, i.e., based on monthly payroll of $100,000 or
less. Under this system, an applicant with $200,000 of monthly payroll
would not have an incentive to reveal all of its information early. It
might apply early for a lower amount of $250,000. In the alternative, it
might apply later for a higher amount of $500,000. But neither
approach maximizes the information collected by the fund. If the
applicant with $200,000 of monthly payroll only applies for $250,000,
the fund administrator does not know that additional extra payroll is
also eligible for fund support. If the same applicant waits to apply later
for $500,000, the fund administrator must also wait for this
information and delay incorporating it into the fund’s developing rules
of distribution.
Instead of an all-or-nothing rule, an information-maximizing
approach could pursue a “top-up” rule. The business with $200,000 of
monthly payroll could apply initially for a grant of $500,000. Although
initially during the $250,000 grant window it would only be eligible to
receive $250,000, it would also remain eligible to receive an additional
top-up of $250,000 later if the maximum grant amount were increased
to at least $500,000. If the applicant with $200,000 of payroll could
receive a $250,000 grant initially, and perhaps an additional top-up
grant of $250,000 later, then the applicant would have an incentive to
reveal more of its information early to the fund administrator.
The top-up approach corresponds to a uniform-price rather than a
multiple-price auction format. In a uniform-price auction, even bidders
who earlier indicated that they would be willing to pay a higher price
for a good will nevertheless pay the lower clearing price. 287 In the
emergency fund context, the top-up approach translates to allowing
applicants who applied for larger loan amounts to at least claim the
smaller loan amount for which the emergency fund allows distribution.
As applied to the PPP, a top-up approach, consistent with the
uniform-price auction approach, would allow an applicant for $2
million, $5 million, or even $10 million to apply for a PPP grant from the
beginning of the program. However, a larger applicant could only claim
the smaller amount that the government had approved as a grant size.

287. See KRISHNA, supra note 274, at 189–91 (distinguishing between multiple-price, or
discriminatory, auctions and uniform-price actions when multiple similar items are sold).
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For instance, the larger applicant could claim $250,000 (if that was the
loan amount initially allowed) in the first tranche of the program, with
the understanding that the loan might increase later to larger amounts.
The advantage of the top-up approach is that it uses small initial
grants to buy information not only from small grant applicants, but
also from larger grant applicants. A disadvantage of the top-up
approach is that allowing larger applicants to apply early may crowd out
smaller applicants. This is especially true assuming that only a limited
number of applications can be processed. The PPP illustrates this
crowding-out disadvantage. The limited loan capacity at intermediary
banks meant that many applications simply could not be processed in
the early first-wave weeks of the program. 288 But still, the idea of
distributing smaller grants first to buy information would be better
than what actually happened with the PPP. In the PPP, important
information, including information about the existence of bottlenecks
in the application process, was discovered only at very high prices.
The advantage of a top-up approach—that it encourages all
applicants to apply early and provide information early—is of greater
importance when the administrator is not sure that distributing
according to grant size is the right way to prioritize the allocation of
emergency funds. If it is not clear what the organizing principle for
distribution should be, more information is more valuable because it
can suggest possible modifications to distribution priorities for later
grants from the fund. Again, the story of the PPP is illustrative. The PPP
story demonstrates that fund administrators can experience learning
curves. This story also shows that a medium-term fund can implement
changes to distribution rules over the course of time.
As one important example of the PPP learning curve, consider the
fact that larger and white-owned businesses disproportionately
received grants in the first wave of the PPP. 289 On one hand, an ex ante
emergency fund design should anticipate structural bias issues. In the
case of the PPP, it was clear that funds would be distributed through
the banking system. Existing data also made clear that disparities exist
in access to the banking system. 290

288. See supra Section II.A (explaining importance of banks in determining access in the first
wave of the PPP).
289. See supra Section II.F (describing studies of racial bias in the PPP).
290. CLAIRE KRAMER MILLS & JESSICA BATTISTO, FED. RSRV. BANK OF NEW YORK, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY: COVID-19’S CONCENTRATED HEALTH AND WEALTH EFFECTS IN BLACK COMMUNITIES 1, 6
(2020), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/smallbusiness/DoubleJeopardy
_COVID19andBlackOwnedBusinesses [perma.cc/4Y5S-QBE6] (finding that “Black firms have been
almost twice as likely” to close, and that despite at least equal rates of application for financing,
Black firms are less likely to have a recent borrowing relationship with a bank); LUCAS MISERA, FED.
RSRV. BANK OF CLEVELAND, AN UPHILL BATTLE: COVID-19’S OUTSIZED TOLL ON MINORITY-OWNED
FIRMS 1, 2–3 (2020), https://www.clevelandfed.org/region/article?ID=DDA321FE-ADC5-4DA7-9A1C-
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On the other hand, the information gathered in the earlier stages of
the PPP probably gave Treasury and the SBA more information about
the disparities in the PPP. For instance, the idea that fintech lenders
would provide better access for businesses owned by people of color
became clearer from PPP data as the program continued. 291 The PPP
data also support the idea that smaller business owners needed time to
learn about and respond to the program. 292 This corresponds to
changes in the program. For instance, the decision to discourage larger
loans helped make funds more available to small businesses. In the
second wave of applications, from April to August 2020, the program
was undersubscribed. 293
The PPP should have started with a plan for addressing predictable
disparities in access to lenders. At the same time, it seems likely that
other emergency funds might also arise with similar ex ante flaws.
When that is the case, a distribution approach that plans for early
information collection and later distribution rule adjustment can help.
Even if early plans fail to address problems with the program, later
changes can try to address these problems.
More generally, when emergency fund instructions are
underspecified, collecting information about the applicant pool might
help later efforts to identify flaws in the initial plan for distribution and
choose among different principles to use in prioritizing fund
distribution. The information could be directly useful to the emergency
fund administrator. It could also be helpful for congressional or
Presidential oversight, or for evaluating the response of public opinion
to the program.
To be sure, the PPP did not fix all of its problems. Even if the second
wave was distributed more equitably, this did not help businesses that
closed immediately in March and April 2020 for lack of liquidity—and
these closed businesses were disproportionately owned by people of
color. 294 The intent here is not to claim that all problems were solved,
but to observe the development of a learning curve for administrators
over the course of the program.
In the case of the PPP, the problems with the first-wave allocation
methods were addressed in part with the help of increased
122DB2F4413D [perma.cc/K7FX-UZQT] (noting that Black-owned, Hispanic-owned and Asianowned businesses closed at a higher rate than white-owned businesses during the COVID crisis
and experienced more acute cash shortages).
291. See Erel & Liebersohn, supra note 182 (showing negative correlations between white
percentage of population and portion of PPP lending extended through online or fintech lenders).
292. See Humphries et al., supra note 95 (reporting on delay in PPP knowledge among small
businesses based on survey evidence from April and May 2020).
293. See supra Section II.C (describing the second wave of the program from April to August of
2020).
294. See supra Section II.F (describing racial disparities in the application of the PPP).
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appropriations from Congress. The initial appropriation of $349 billion
was later increased to more than $800 billion. 295 Additional
congressional appropriations allowed a continuation of the program
under modified distribution rules in the second wave, and then in the
third.
The importance of gathering information before all the funds are
spent is even more important if the emergency fund really is finite.
That is, a finite emergency fund, rather than the expanding PPP,
provides an even stronger case for using early grants to gather
information about applicants. Especially in a finite emergency fund
situation, funds distributed early might be best spent in a dual-purpose
fashion. The first dollars out the door should be allocated in a way that
both sends funds to those more eligible to receive them and also gathers
information about the applicant pool.
E. Speed
A question of time is presented by a descending-order-of-necessity
or increasing-grant-size approach to emergency fund disbursement.
Other examples of descending-price auctions, like those conducted by
the Treasury to sell bonds, proceed very quickly. But the emergency
fund allocation approach described here requires the dedication of
periods of time to successive application categories. 296 Using the PPP as
an example, we can observe that initially time would have had to be
dedicated to the earlier tranches offering smaller grants. Because it is
easier to distribute a large sum with $10 million grants than with
$250,000 grants, the increasing-grant-size allocation approach would
have slowed the PPP’s infusion of cash into the economy.
In other words, the descending-order-of-necessity approach does
not eliminate the tradeoff between accuracy and speed. It only
mitigates the tradeoff. The descending-order-of-necessity approach
allows cash to begin to flow immediately, but requires that it flow more
slowly.
An administrator can design a faster fund flow by increasing the
beginning tranche of the distribution. Using the PPP as an example, the
initial loan amount could have been set at $500,000, or $1 million,
rather than $250,000. This still would have gathered information more
efficiently than the actual result—a free-for-all in the first wave of the

295. PPP REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH MAY 2021, supra note 2, at 2 (reporting $799.8 billion
approved); American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 5001(d), 135 Stat. 4 (increasing
PPP allocation to $813.7 billion).
296. See, e.g., supra Section V.C (describing fourteen-day application periods for two stages of
shuttered live venue funding based on percentage of revenue lost).
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PPP. In fact, the PPP spent amounts up to $10 million to collect
information about the applicant pool in the first wave. 297 It could have
collected similar information for a much lower price.
In addition, if the fund were administered with a top-up approach,
so that an initial grant could later be increased, then initial funds in at
least some amount could have been distributed to a large number of
borrowers while collecting information about all applicants. Borrowers
would have received some benefit early in the program, and, at the
same time, larger borrowers would still have had the possible future
benefit of an additional grant under the program. If larger borrowers
were better able to bear and manage risk and uncertainty compared to
smaller borrowers, larger borrowers would have been better able to
estimate and update estimates of the likelihood of a grant. They might
have estimated the likelihood of a grant by examining data about
disbursements under the fund and borrowed against the anticipation
of a future grant.
The PPP is an example of an emergency fund with information and
time constraints and a medium-term timeline continuing over a period
of months.298 This kind of fund presents a tradeoff between additional
information and reduced speed of disbursement. But this tradeoff is
not absolute. For example, it is not necessary to first collect all available
information and then begin distributing. The distribution-indescending-order-of-necessity idea allows a fund administrator to
simultaneously begin funding and collecting information.
The first-wave distributions of the PPP successfully gathered
information about the applicant pool. The first wave revealed the
enormous demand for the program. It revealed that bank clients,
especially well-connected bank borrowers, were more likely to receive a
PPP loan. 299 It also revealed structural racial bias in the distribution of
PPP proceeds. 300
This first-wave information supported adjustments to the PPP
going forward. 301 But the government overpaid for this information.
When similar opportunities arise in the future, emergency fund
administrators could collect the information they need for program
design more cheaply. A fund could still achieve some speed of

297. See SEC FILINGS: PUBLIC COMPANIES RECEIVING SBA PPP LOANS UNDER THE CARES ACT,
supra note 139 (listing ten unreturned $10 million loans made in April 2020).
298. See supra Section I.C (describing similar emergency funds).
299. See supra Section II.A (describing advantage of certain bank clients in first few weeks of
PPP).
300. See supra Section II.F (describing structural bias of PPP and comparing first and second
waves).
301. See supra Section II.C (describing second wave from April to August 2020); Section II.D
(describing third wave from January to May 2021).
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distribution, because it could begin disbursement of some funds—even
if not in the largest possible amounts—right away.
CONCLUSION
The ambiguity and uncertainty about what, exactly, the Paycheck
Protection Program was supposed to do need not block the opportunity
to learn from it as an example of emergency fund administration.
Future emergency funds will likely involve underspecified instructions,
just like the PPP. As emergency fund administrators choose whether to
leave fund allocation to private actors or whether, and how, to exert
more control over allocation, they will face information and time
constraints, as in the PPP. How can they fulfill their responsibility of
distributing money now, while also gathering information that could
improve allocation decisions?
There is a tradeoff between speed and accuracy. But the design of
an emergency fund can accommodate a learning curve. Immediate
distribution can be coupled with back-end adjustments, so that the
disbursement of funds can happen early and anticipate adjustments to
repayment terms later. The tradeoff between speed and accuracy can
also be mitigated by distributing according to descending necessity.
This allows an administrator to both begin disbursing funds
immediately and also collect information on which to base
improvements in future distribution policy.

